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Abstract 
 
This paper provides new estimates of the return on capital employed (ROCE) for major 
British railway companies. It shows that ROCE was generally below the cost of capital 
after the mid-1870s and fell till the turn of the century.  Addressing cost inefficiency 
issues could have restored ROCE to an adequate level in the late 1890s but not in 1910. 
Declines in ROCE hit share prices and investors made little or no money in real terms 
after 1897.  Optimal portfolio analysis shows that, whilst railway securities were 
attractive to investors before this date, they would have been justified in rushing to the 
exits thereafter. 
 
 
 
 
 
We are indebted to Michael Edelstein for providing us with his data set and to the staff of 
the British Transport Commission Record Offices in London, Edinburgh and York for 
their generous help.  Tony Arnold, Richard Grossman and Tim Leunig made helpful 
comments on an earlier draft.  Hyun J. Im and Tugrul Vehbi provided valuable research 
assistance. We have also benefited from suggestions by seminar participants at the 
University of Birmingham, University College Dublin and the LSE Cliometrics Study 
Group.  The normal disclaimer applies. 
  
 
2 
In the late nineteenth century British railway companies operated a significant fraction of 
the nation's capital stock and comprised a major part of the asset base held in private 
portfolios.  The performance of these businesses mattered. 
 
Recent writers have been highly critical.  Arnold and McCartney found that the 
weighted−average return on capital employed fell from 4.81 per cent in 1872 to 3.85 per 
cent in 1892 and to 3.54 per cent in 1912 as the railway network continued to expand and 
described both the industry's results and also the returns that it offered investors during 
this period as 'consistently disappointing'.1  Goetzmann and Ukhov who performed a 
portfolio analysis for the period 1870 to 1913 in which domestic railway shares were one 
of the available asset classes concluded that the optimal weighting for this sector was 
zero.2  Kennedy and Delargy noted the persistent tendency for railway shares to exhibit 
low dividend yields (high price to earnings ratios) as a sign of 'irrational exuberance' on 
the Victorian stock exchange.3 
 
Hawke calculated that the social rate of return on railway investments, taking account 
both of benefits to users from improved transport and of net earnings accruing to owners, 
was between 15 and 20 per cent during 1830 to 1870 and he concluded that railways were 
continuing to provide socially advantageous investment opportunities throughout that 
period.4 
 
A number of issues remain to be resolved.  For example, the profitability record of 
individual companies on a net paid-up capital basis needs to be established as do its 
implications for share prices and shareholder returns.  Similarly, there has been no 
explicit quantification of the extent to which profitability could have been improved by 
reducing inefficiency.  Furthermore it is not clear quite when the experience of railway 
shareholders turned sour or whether a detailed analysis would reveal that some companies 
remained good investments.  Finally, recent research by Leunig facilitates a new 
calculation of the social rate of return for the late Victorian period.5 
 
This paper seeks to fill these gaps.  In particular, the following questions are addressed.   
 
1)  What was the rate of return on capital employed (ROCE) of major railway companies, 
how did this compare with the cost of capital and how did it relate to stock market 
returns? 
 
2)  Was eliminating inefficiency a route to restoring earlier levels of profitability as 
ROCE fell in the late nineteenth century? 
 
                                                 
1
 Arnold and McCartney, 'Rates of return', p. 54.  
2
 Goetzmann and Ukhov, 'British investment'. 
3
 W. P. Kennedy and R. Delargy, 'Explaining Victorian entrepreneurship: a cultural problem?, a market 
problem?, no problem?', LSE Department of Economic History working paper no. 61/00 (2000), p. 23. 
4
 Hawke, Railways and economic growth, pp. 405-408. 
5
 Leunig, 'Time is money'. 
  
 
3 
3)  At what point did the attractions of holding the securities of these various railway 
companies in investors' portfolios begin to wane? 
 
4)  What was the social rate of return on railways in the late nineteenth century? 
 
The starting point for our analysis is a comparison of net revenues from the Railway 
Returns with estimates of paid-up capital and accumulated capital expenditures from 
company accounts.  Next, we draw on estimates of cost functions and cost inefficiency 
made by Crafts et al. to examine the feasibility of improving ROCE by controlling costs 
better or by amalgamations.  Estimates of ROCE at the level of the individual company 
are then related to holding returns on the companies securities using the data collected by 
Edelstein from the Investors' Monthly Manual.6  These data also permit an optimal 
portfolio analysis which takes account of both risk and return and explicitly recognizes 
that railway shares may have valuable diversification properties.  Finally, we make a 
calculation of the social rate of return in the late nineteenth century taking account of 
social savings as well as net earnings.7 
 
I 
 
This section presents evidence on the profitability (ROCE) of Britain’s railways between 
1870 and 1912. The concept of profit is a comparatively simple one:  business receipts 
minus business costs equals profit, divide by capital employed to obtain the rate of profit.  
Of course, any accountant will tell you that it is not as simple as that, and that receipts, 
costs and capital are all capable of various definitions, even in the case of a small one-
person business.  This applies a fortiori in the case of complex corporate businesses.  
Moreover, in the case of late nineteenth-century British railway companies there are 
peculiarities which complicate things, especially to modern minds.  We must, therefore, 
give some consideration to the concepts of capital and profit as seen by investors and 
managers of the period.     
 
The most readily available data that approximate to profits for the railway companies are 
those of “net traffic revenue” given in the official Railway Returns, published annually in 
the Sessional Papers of Parliament, and known initially as Returns of Capital, Traffic and 
Working Expenditure.  Whilst some of these appeared before 1870 under earlier 
legislation, the returns for the period from then up to 1912 were collected under the Act 
of 1868 which standardized the form in which companies had to make the returns, and 
these constitute a uniform and consistent series.  They do not, however, correspond 
precisely to a modern concept of profit, nor even to one which would have been 
recognized at the time.  Only traffic receipts and expenditures are taken into account, thus 
ignoring such things as head office expenses, professional fees, bank charges, rent 
charges either received or paid out, and receipts from investments other than in the 
enterprise concerned.  Fortunately, so far as the major companies are concerned, where 
                                                 
6
  These data were the basis of the research report in Edelstein, Overseas investment. 
7
  Crafts et al., 'Were British railway companies'. 
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these can be traced they did not come to very much in proportion to traffic outlays and 
revenues.8 
 
One major difference between normal concepts of profit and those used in relation to late-
nineteenth century railway companies lies in the treatment of debt charges.  In most 
businesses at the time as well as later, interest payments on debt incurred would have 
counted as a cost, to be deducted from revenue before arriving at profit.  But so far as 
railway accounts were concerned, debt – or, more precisely, long-term debt – was 
regarded as part of the capital of a company.  This point should be borne in mind when 
assessing rates of return on capital.  En passant, it may be noted that short-term 
borrowings, including loans from banks, seldom, if ever, amounted to very much in 
relation to the size of the capital account as a whole. 
 
Data on the paid-up capital of the railway companies is given in the Railway Returns but 
a more satisfactory source is the half-yearly accounts and reports to their shareholders. 
These survived for all the main companies and a great many lesser ones, and were at one 
time kept by the then British Transport Commission Historical Records offices in 
London, Edinburgh and York.  Not only does this source enable one to correct the 
occasional error in the official figures, but it provides the possibility of  assessing the 
expenditure side of the capital accounts as well as giving additional detail on paid-up 
capital, especially prior to 1890, which was the first year in which nominal additions to 
capital were noted in the Returns.     
 
Apart from the inclusion of long-term debt as part of the capital of the railway companies, 
there are other complexities in the definition of nineteenth-century railway capital which 
make it inappropriate simply to use the statistics given in the Railway Returns.  The main 
one is the inclusion in the statistics of paid-up capital of the nominal additions, or 
occasionally deductions, which many companies made to their capital for various reasons.  
In the early days, they were usually associated with company amalgamations.  For 
example, at the amalgamation of the London & Birmingham, Grand Junction and 
Manchester & Birmingham, which constituted the London & North Western, the shares 
of the GJ were valued at 25% more than their nominal value because of their relative 
market price, and this resulted in the nominal addition to the new company’s paid-up 
capital of nearly £965,000.  Whilst in a capital of £13.5 million this was not insignificant, 
it was nothing to what was to come later and unlike the LNWR in 1847 could in no way 
be seen as reflecting a change in the actual value of the companies. 
 
By the 1880s, the most common cause of nominal additions was the consolidation of 
preference or loan stocks, so that one stock with a uniform rate of interest or dividend 
replaced a variety of pre-existing stocks.  A good example is the Midland Railway 
                                                 
8
 The largest example we found was for LNWR in 1907 where total revenue was £280,000 higher than its 
traffic revenue of £5,730,000. Since most of this “non-traffic” revenue was, in fact, derived from joint lines 
(with a small amount from shares in other companies), it is almost certain that the rate of profit on this 
branch of revenue was roughly similar to that on the traffic. 
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Company, which in 1897-8 converted its debentures from 4% or 6% stocks to a uniform 
2.5%; but in order to satisfy the owners, and to ensure fairness between the holders of the 
different original stocks, increased the nominal value of its debentures from £28.8 million 
to £35 million.  At the same time, all its preference shares were converted to a 2.5% 
basis, which entailed the nominal addition of £15.7 million to that category, whilst its 
ordinary shares were split into preferred 2.5% and deferred shares, thus nominally 
doubling the £34.7 million of its equity.  This was a massive addition to the reported 
paid-up capital of the company but, of course, nothing additional was paid.  The result of 
all the Midland’s conversions in 1897-8 was to increase the nominal value of its paid-up 
capital (including debentures) from £100 million to £168 million, with less than £5 
million representing actual investment.9  The effect of this on the recorded rate of return 
would appear to suggest catastrophic misfortune or mismanagement but this is actually 
quite illusory. 
 
Other companies which behaved similarly were the Caledonian in 1895-6, the Great 
Northern in 1890-1, the London & South Western in 1890-1, and the North British in 
1889-90.10  Most companies made nominal additions to their capital at some time or 
other, and, as mentioned above, it is only from 1890 onwards that these were recorded in 
Railway Returns.  However, they appear in the companies’ accounts for earlier years, and 
it is usually possible to subtract them from the figures of finance received.11  All figures 
of paid-up capital in this paper are exclusive of nominal additions or deductions except 
those in Table 2C which illustrate their pitfalls.12 
 
Three other changes need to be made to the paid-up capital as recorded in Railway 
Returns, or, for that matter, in the companies’ accounts, before they can be used to 
provide rates of return which reflect the realities of capital employed and enable accurate 
comparisons between companies to be made.  A minor change is the addition of the 
balance of premiums and discounts on stock issues.   By 1912, these amounted to an extra 
10% or so on the paid-up capital of one or two of the more successful companies, such as 
the London & North Western and the Great Western; and this was probably also true of 
the Midland and the North Eastern, though neither of these showed the balance 
separately.  The proportion had been much lower in 1870 and was usually less than 2% 
until the 1880s.  The Great Eastern had a small negative balance throughout, though it 
was insignificant by 1900.  The Manchester, Sheffield & Lincolnshire also had a negative 
                                                 
9
 The curious may wonder what happened to the asset side of the balance sheet.  The answer is that an item 
was added entitled “nominal additions on consolidation of stocks”. 
10
 The Great Western and the London, Brighton and South Coast actually made some small nominal 
deductions in the course of amalgamations before our period. 
11
 Nominal additions have sometimes been referred to as ‘water’ in the capital.  They did not represent 
finance actually received and used.  A minor point may be made here: A relatively small sum – about £0.2 
million, the result of the notorious Redpath frauds  – cannot be removed accurately from the Great 
Northern’s capital account in the 1850s. 
12
 The distortions resulting from the inclusion of nominal additions to capital were clearly pointed out by 
Cain, ‘Railways, 1870-1914’ and by Irving ‘Capitalisation of Britain’s railways’.  Both of these authors 
highlighted the implications for perceptions of profitability of the railway sector as a whole but did not give 
detailed figures for each company. 
  
 
6 
balance during the 1870s, whilst almost certainly this should apply to the London, 
Chatham & Dover too.13  
 
The last two changes concern the relationship of the major company with other 
companies.  Most of the majors worked lines which they leased from other smaller 
companies.  Clearly these lines contributed to both the receipts and expenditures, and 
hence the net revenues, of the big company; therefore their capital account (for which, 
unlike the revenue account, they made separate returns) should be included with that of 
the major for the purpose of assessing the rate of return to either paid-up capital or to 
capital expended.14  Finally, most of the majors at some time or other made subscriptions 
to other companies, often, but not always, those whose lines they leased and worked. The 
amount of these subscriptions needs to be deducted from their paid-up capital.  Not to do 
so in the case of lines worked by the majors would be to double-count this part of the 
capital which they employed; whilst in the case of lines worked independently, these 
made their own separate returns of net revenue and did not contribute to those of the 
majors.  This also applies to contributions to joint lines set up by two or more companies 
where they made separate traffic returns, though it may be noted that these sometimes 
made a small contribution to the non-traffic revenues of the majors.  
    
Another feature of railway accounting which seems unfamiliar to modern eyes relates to 
internal financing of expenditure on capital equipment.  Apart from suspense accounts for 
the renewal of rolling stock, steamboats and, occasionally, rail track, there was little 
deliberate retention of earnings in order to finance capital expenditure, certainly prior to 
1900 or thereabouts.  In other words, expenditures which the accounting conventions of 
the day regarded as appropriate to the capital account were very largely financed through 
that account, which was not itself financed out of profits.   However, expenditures which 
were regarded as maintenance or renewal of capital equipment were covered in the 
revenue accounts.  In other words, they were treated as current expenses, to be met before 
net revenue was arrived at.  These expenditures naturally included elements of addition to 
the stock of capital, both through replacements which were more modern and efficient 
than the original items and through the purchase of additional items.  The majority of 
maintenance expenditure was, however, in the nature of depreciation expenditure, 
something which did not appear in railway company accounts at the time.  To all 
concerned, the assumption at that period was that, provided they were properly 
maintained, railway assets, or at any rate the majority of them, had an indefinite life.  
Those that clearly did not, such as rails and rolling stock, were either dealt with by the 
                                                 
13
 The actual paid-up capital of this company cannot be ascertained owing to great irregularities in its 
accounting up to the late 1860s, though many share issues were certainly discounted and others were 
awarded as payment to contractors.  The figures which are given here are based on a court award made in 
1870 and are almost certainly inflated, even though no nominal additions were officially admitted when 
they were first officially recorded in 1890.  The company’s accounts for the second half of 1869 give its 
paid-up shares and loans as £7.2 million and £4.0 million respectively, whereas a year later, after the court 
award, they were given as £12.1 million and £5.0 million. At that time the cumulated capital expenditures of 
the company amounted to £14.7 million. 
14
 Including worked lines raises capital expended by about 10 per cent at the start of our period and by 
about 3 per cent at the end. 
  
 
7 
suspense accounts mentioned previously, or by expenditure out of revenue.   The question 
therefore arises as to whether it is appropriate to measure the rate of profit in relation to 
gross (i.e. un-depreciated) capital stock.  In an ideal world, it would surely be better to use 
net capital, but, given the limitations of the available data imposed by contemporary 
accounting conventions, this would only be possible by making assumptions about the 
length of life of the various items of capital and reworking the companies’ accounts. And, 
if this were done, the figures of gross capital derived from the companies’ capital 
accounts would first need to be increased by estimates of their expenditure on renewals of 
scrapped equipment, which would require yet more assumptions.  This scarcely seems 
worthwhile in the light of the subsequent survival of the railways into the second half of 
the twentieth century.  Much of the roadbed, the tunnels, cuttings and embankments, and 
even many of the bridges and stations remained in use until after 1950, and quite a large 
amount is still being operated.  It seems likely that the contemporary assumption that 
proper maintenance and renewal was a substitute for an amortization account will not 
distort the picture by very much.  
 
Whilst railway historians have measured the rate of profit in relation to the liabilities side 
of the balance sheet, i.e., its paid-up capital, it is also possible to do so in relation to the 
capital assets employed.  As was mentioned earlier, the many surviving accounts of 
railway companies allow us to measure the capital expenditure over time of all the larger 
ones and most of the smaller ones which were operated by them. Provided one is 
prepared to accept the accounting convention of the day that structures did not wear out 
and obsolesce, and that the depreciation of other assets was covered by maintenance and 
renewals expenditures on the revenue account, cumulated capital expenditures at the end 
of each year probably present a more accurate picture of the value of the capital involved 
than do the finances raised, though, of course, the differences should not be great.  And, 
indeed, they were only rarely higher than 0.5 per cent except in the case of the Taff Vale 
Company, which had by some way the highest rate of return on every measure and was 
the only company to make significant investments out of revenue. It should be pointed 
out, however, that whilst the cumulated capital expenditures of lines worked, but not 
owned, by the major companies have mostly been taken from the reported accounts of the 
lines concerned, a few such accounts have not survived, and in these cases the change in 
the paid-up capital given in Railway Returns had to be used as a proxy.15    
   
We believe that a case can be made for using either the adjusted paid-up capital as 
described above or the cumulated capital expenditures for all lines worked as a measure 
of ROCE.  In Tables 1 and 2 both are shown and generally they give a quite similar 
picture of performance.  It is not, however, appropriate to use estimates based on own 
paid-up capital including nominal additions. In Table 2C these are displayed for 
comparison and it is clear that the discrepancy is sometimes large, notably in the case of 
the Midland. 
 
                                                 
15
 Fortunately, the great majority of the records of the lines leased by the GER, the GWR, and the Scottish 
companies have survived, these major companies being the principal ones which operated leased lines in 
our period.      
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In general, the use of estimates of ROCE which are based on paid-up capital including 
nominal additions tends to exaggerate the fall in profitability of railway companies in the 
latter part of the period.  This was recognized by both Cain and Irving.16  The ROCE 
estimates in Table 1 decline by considerably less than those reported by Arnold and 
McCartney who appear not to have adjusted for nominal additions to paid-up capital.17 
 
The picture that emerges from Tables 1 and 2 is the following.  Taking the fifteen 
companies as a whole, Table 1 reports that the 5-year moving average of ROCE fell from 
5.11 per cent in 1872 to a low of 4.29 per cent in 1893 but had recovered to 4.46 per cent 
in 1910 based on paid-up capital or from 5.63 per cent in 1872 to a low of 4.51 per cent in 
1903 before recovering to 4.62 per cent in 1910 based on cumulated capital expenditures.  
This is similar to the estimates reported by Cain but a much better performance than 
suggested by Arnold and McCartney.18  Table 2 shows that there were quite big 
differences in profitability across companies and that changes in profitability over time 
were by no means perfectly correlated.  Indeed, three or four companies actually had a 
higher ROCE in 1910 than in 1872. 
 
II 
 
The reasons for the decline in railway profitability documented above have been disputed.  
Aldcroft stressed the role of poor investment policies which led to over-expansion of the 
network while Irving argued that the real problems lay in operating inefficiency especially 
prior to 1900.19  Cain underlined the importance of waste and inefficiency but also 
pointed out that from the mid-1890s railways were subject to regulation which both raised 
their costs and prevented them increasing their freight prices.20  Arnold and McCartney 
suggested that these problems were exacerbated by the failure of railway management to 
pursue amalgamations with other companies.21 
 
This section seeks to quantify the contribution of waste and inefficiency in undermining 
profitability using the results obtained by Crafts et al. based on deriving a cost frontier for 
the British railway industry and thus estimating cost inefficiency (the ratio of actual to 
minimum feasible costs) for each major company in every year from 1893 to 1912.22  
These authors estimated an equation of the type 
 
     Cjt =  αj  +  βXjt  +  vjt  +  ujt                                                                                     (1) 
 
where C is total costs, X is a vector of inputs or outputs, v is an idiosyncratic random 
error term, u is the non-negative cost-inefficiency component, and where the intercept 
                                                 
16
 Cain, ‘Railways, 1870-1914’, p. 110; Irving, ‘Capitalisation of Britain’s railways’, p. 3, 17. 
17
 Arnold and McCartney, ‘Rates of return’. 
18
 Ibid., Table 2 and Cain, ‘Railways, 1870-1914’, Table 4. 
19
  Aldcroft, British railways, ch. 1 and Irving, 'Profitability and performance', p. 65 and 'Capitalisation of 
Britain's railways', pp. 18-19. 
20
  Cain, 'Railways, 1870-1914', pp. 108-112. 
21
  Arnold and McCartney, 'Rates of return', pp. 54-55. 
22
  Crafts et al., Were British railway companies'. 
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term varies across companies to take account of heterogeneity of operating conditions.  
The implementation of this approach took account of variations in input prices, density of 
traffic, capital and operating expenditures, and passenger and freight outputs and allowed 
cost inefficiency to vary over time.  The results also allow the extent of economies of 
scale to be inferred.  Crafts et al. found that cost inefficiency was considerable in the late 
nineteenth century but was much reduced by the end of the period. 
 
Estimates of cost inefficiency (the percentage by which actual costs exceeded minimum 
feasible costs) for 1897 and 1910 are reported in Tables 3 and 4.  Generally speaking, cost 
inefficiency was a good deal higher in the earlier year.  Crafts et al. reported that for this 
sample of companies median cost inefficiency peaked at the turn of the century at 10.2 
per cent but then fell sharply with a clear tendency for those with the most inefficiency to 
show the greatest improvement, as is reflected in Tables 3 and 4.23  This is consistent 
with the picture presented by Cain and Irving of management responding to a potential 
profits crisis by improving efficiency, notably in the operation of freight trains, at a time 
when freight charges were frozen by regulation and input prices were rising.24  The 
implication is that railway managers, who were not strictly disciplined either by 
competition or by shareholders, were taken out the comfort zone and had to act. 
 
In Table 3 the (unweighted) average ROCE goes up by 0.6 percentage points but six 
companies (CR, GNR, LYR, LNWR, MSLR, MR) would still be below their 1872 level 
of profitability and only LNWR and TVR would be above 6 per cent while eight 
companies would still be below 5 per cent.  Obviously, to a significant extent this 
vindicates Irving.  If, however, capital expenditures were also reduced by the 
cost−inefficiency percentage as in counterfactual ROCE (2), then the average ROCE 
would be raised by 1.2 percentage points and all companies but CR and GNR (both only 
marginally below) are back to at least the 1872 profitability level.  This suggests that 
wasteful use of capital did make an important contribution to declining profitability and 
that Aldcroft's indictment cannot be dismissed out of hand.  That said, capital is a fixed 
factor of production and could only have been adjusted in the long run rather than 
instantaneously. 
 
Nevertheless, in 1897, if railway management had exerted better control of operating 
costs, then the 1870s level of profitability could have been more or less restored.  This 
was no longer the case in 1910.  The estimates of counterfactual ROCE (1) in Table 4 
show that removing cost inefficiency in operating expenditures would only have raised 
average ROCE by 0.3 percentage points and eleven companies would be below the 1872 
profitability level.  Under the pressure of addressing capital market concerns about 
declining returns, much of the inefficiency of 1897 had been removed and counterfactual 
ROCE (3) in Table 4 suggests that this was just as well.  The implication of the estimates 
in Table 4 is that railways were indeed operating in a more difficult environment in 1910; 
much of the fat had been cut out but still ROCE was generally below 1897 levels. 
 
                                                 
23
 Crafts et al., 'Were British railway companies', pp. 852-853. 
24
 Cain, 'Railways, 1870-1914', p. 117; Irving, North Eastern Railway Company, p. 281. 
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The cost function estimated by Crafts et al. implies that there were modestly increasing 
returns to scale in the railway industry such that if output doubled, average costs would be 
predicted to fall by 8 per cent.  This has implications for the potential of amalgamations 
to rescue profitability.  The two largest proposals in the early twentieth century were 
LNWR + MR + LYR and GER + GNR + GCR.  In each case, the implied average cost 
reductions, including both capital and operating costs, would have been sufficient to raise 
ROCE of the combined enterprise compared with the weighted average of the separate 
enterprises by about 1 percentage point to 5.75 and 5.06 per cent, respectively. 
 
This is surely too optimistic a view of the potential gains in profitability from 
amalgamation.  First, although the Board of Trade was sympathetic to the view that costs 
would be lowered they would expect a quid pro quo through tighter regulation including 
of passenger fares.25 Second, the hostility of traders and their support in parliament was 
such that there was no possibility in the last years before World War I of a deal on terms 
that would allow the companies to improve their profitability.26 Third, when, in the 
context of their postwar financial plight, the railway companies were eventually 
amalgamated through the grouping introduced by the Railways Act of 1921, the 
legislation introduced the notion of standard net revenue at a level consistent with 
restoring the rate of return of 1913 but with charges to be reduced if this was exceeded.27 
In  other words, even if amalgamation did lower costs, the political reality both pre- and 
postwar was that the regulatory framework would ensure that the impact on profitability 
was negligible. 
 
In sum, the implications of this analysis are that whereas in the 1890s there was still 
scope for management action to restore ROCE to something like 1870s levels by the end 
of our period this had evaporated.  This was bound to have repercussions on the 
attractiveness of holding railway shares, even though this concept of profitability does not 
strictly relate to the profit due to holders of the railway securities analyzed below, because 
it will have a major impact on the cash flow available to reward them. 
 
III 
The expansion of railways in the mid-19th century played a major role in the development 
of British capital markets.28 By the early 1870s, the railway sector represented around one 
quarter of all securities quoted on the London Stock Exchange (LSE), excluding British 
government debt. Investors, such as the Phoenix Assurance, continued to commit new 
investment funds to railways through the following decade.29 Towards the end of the 19th 
century, domestic railway securities were regarded as “blue chip”, a status confirmed by 
                                                 
25
 This position was clearly articulated in the "Report of the Departmental Committee on Railway 
Agreements and Amalgamations", British Parliamentary Papers 1911 vol. XXIX. 
26
 Cain, 'Railway combination', p. 119. 
27
 Crompton and Jupe, 'Awkward fence', p. 441.  The legislation did not guarantee that standard net revenue 
would be achieved but entailed that returns in excess of this amount were to be shared such that 80 per cent 
were returned to customers through price cuts. 
28
 Mitchell, ‘The coming of the railway’. 
29
 Trebilcock, Phoenix Assurance, pp.70. 
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the citing of railway securities as eligible investments for any trust fund under the 1889 
and 1893 Trust Investment Acts. This legislation created considerable investor demand 
for domestic railway debentures in the 1890s, and the rise in debenture prices pushed the 
yields of the leading companies close to Consols, and considerably below those available 
from leading foreign railways.30 
 
As well as debenture stocks, late Victorian investors were able to trade preference shares 
and ordinary shares issued by domestic railway companies.  The 15 domestic railway 
companies in our sample issued a total of 33 different securities continuously quoted on 
the LSE (see Appendix 1).31  Investors could have earned a total return on any quoted 
security comprising a capital gain (or loss) and an income component.   Hence, total real 
returns are defined as: 
 
1)1(
)//( 11
−
+
+
=
−−
t
ijtijtijtijt
ijt I
PDPP
r      (2) 
 
where =ijtP the sterling price of the security issued by the i
th company of the jth type and 
=j 1 (ordinary shares), 2 (preference shares), 3 (debentures) published for the last week 
of December of the tth year, =ijtD the sterling cash dividend or interest payment by the i
th 
company on the jth security type published for the last week of December of the tth year, 
=tI  the annual price inflation for the t
th
 year. 
 
The annual time-series of the total real returns to each security is taken from the dataset 
constructed by Edelstein for which the primary source for security prices, debenture 
coupons, and preference and ordinary share dividends was The Investors Monthly Manual 
(IMM).32   
                                                 
30
 “British and Argentine Railway Debentures”, The Economist, 10 June, 1893, pp.692; and “English and 
Foreign Railway Debenture Stocks”, The Economist, 14 March, 1896.  
31
 We have included Taff Vale Railway in this section, but excluded it from the section following because it 
was a much smaller capitalization stock than the other 14 railways, at around half the size of the next 
largest, London Chatham and Dover, and less than one-tenth the size of the London and North-Western 
Railway, based on total capitalization in 1868. Kennedy and Delargy, 'Explaining Victorian 
entrepreneurship’, Table 1.  
32
 Edelstein, Overseas investment. This dataset was supplemented with the year-end ordinary share returns 
for Taff Vale based on annual share prices and dividends also taken from the IMM. Edelstein uses Phelps 
Brown’s cost of living index as the deflator of the nominal returns series. We have elected to use throughout 
the more recent deflator from Feinstein, National Income, Tables 2 and 5. Any missing nominal return 
observations were checked against the same source. If prices were still missing, they were in-filled with the 
mean values for the other railway securities of the same class in that year. We also adjusted returns to take 
account of any capital changes. CR, GNR, LBSCR, LSWR, MSLR/GCR, MR, and NBR split their ordinary 
shares into preferred ordinary and deferred ordinary shares. In the case of LBSCR, NBR, GNR, and MR 
and MSLR/GCR in 1883, 1888, 1891, and 1897 respectively, the ordinary shares appear to have been 
retired and were no longer quoted in IMM. Hence, after these dates we have used changes in dividends and 
share price returns on the deferred ordinary shares as representing the residual returns to shareholders. We 
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The mean and standard deviation of the annual total real returns for each ordinary share, 
preference share, and debenture are summarized in Table 5. The equally-weighted 
average returns for each of the three railway asset classes are graphed in Figure 1. 
Ordinary share returns were considerably more volatile than preference share and 
debenture returns, between which there was little to choose. Further study of all three 
series also suggests a break in all around 1897/98. This break is consistent with the 
pattern of quinquennial returns reported by Kennedy and Delargy.33 Hence, we also 
compute returns for the sub-periods, 1870-97 and 1898-1913 in Table 5.  Ordinary shares, 
preference shares and debentures on average returned +6.7%, +6.2% and +5.8% per 
annum, respectively, between 1870 and 1897. In the later period up to WWI, however, all 
three railway asset classes generated little or no real return and the ordinary shares of Taff 
Vale (TVR) were the only security to deliver a statistically significantly positive return to 
investors. 
 
More importantly, the relative returns of domestic railway securities of all three types 
deteriorated. In the earlier period to 1897, they offered a healthy premium of around 2 to 
3% over the 4% annual real return on Consols (Table 5, Panel C). Subsequently, this 
premium shrank to 0.5% or less, when Consols averaged a negative real return of -0.5% 
per annum. Similarly, the decline in domestic railway returns relative to those on foreign 
railway securities was marked. Hence, although foreign railway debenture returns 
performed in line with their domestic cousins prior to the late 1890s, they proved far 
more attractive investments later on, and in no single year delivered a negative return.34  
 
Investors receive their return on any security through price changes and income, either 
interest or dividends. A closer inspection of equation (2) indicates that the total real return 
in the case of ordinary shares is equal to the arithmetic sum of the capital return and the 
dividend yield, both in real terms. Now, we can consider the relative contribution of each 
component to the total returns of railway shares. 
 
As residual claimants on a company’s assets, ordinary shareholders receive dividends on 
their shares from any profits remaining after payment of the fixed interest and fixed 
dividends due to debenture and preference shares, respectively. Overall, ordinary share 
dividends in the sector trended down after about 1890. The fall in the 5-year moving 
average of sector dividends paid as a percentage of par value between the 1880s and early 
1900s reflects the deterioration in the returns on capital employed discussed above (Table 
6, Panel A). 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
did not adopt this approach with CR and LSWR because the split into preferred and deferred ordinary was 
at the option of the shareholder, and the ordinary shares both continued to trade and had dividends declared 
on them.  
33
 Kennedy and Delargy, 'Explaining Victorian entrepreneurship’, Table 11a. 
34
 The mean return (standard deviation) of foreign railway debentures was 5.7% (3.8%) and 5.1% (2.9%) in 
1870-97 and 1898-1913, respectively, based on  Edelstein’s nominal returns deflated by Feinstein’s 
consumer price series. 
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There was, of course, considerable variation in dividends paid and dividend yields across 
companies. This tended to reflect underlying business performance. TVR paid a very 
healthy dividend throughout. On the other hand, MLSR (GCR) passed their dividend 
from the late 1890s onwards, whilst the LCDR paid no dividends at all in any year during 
the period.  Nevertheless, there is a strong correlation between changes in ROCE and 
changes in dividends relative to par value as the following regression based on the 
combined data of Tables 2 and 6 shows (t-statistics in parentheses): 
 
        ∆ (Div/Par)  =  0.0003   +   3.174 ∆ROCE          R2  =  0.635 
                                 (0.08)         (3.49) 
 
Nominal dividend yields fell steadily from an average of 3.7% in 1877 to 2.8% in 1897, 
followed by a recovery to 3.5% in 1910 (Table 6, Panel B).  The implication is that when 
dividends relative to par value fell in the 1880s the market chose not to reduce equity 
prices so as to maintain the dividend yield, but began to mark prices down in the 1890s 
up to the years immediately before WW1.  This process of de-rating the shares generated 
negative real capital returns.  Table 7 decomposes total returns on ordinary shares in real 
terms into the real dividend yield and the real capital gain or loss. Capital returns to the 
15 railway ordinary shares fluctuated considerably more than their dividends, and losses 
first began appearing in the early 1890s (Table 7, Panel B). The dividend yield helped to 
keep the total returns on domestic railways in positive territory until the turn of the 
century. In the following decade, capital losses more than offset the dividend yield to 
push total returns into negative territory until there was a modest recovery from 1910 to 
1913 (Table 7, Panel C).  
 
Thus, as would be expected, the deterioration in returns on capital employed had adverse 
consequences for shareholders.  The long-term implications were that dividends were 
reduced and then share prices fell, notably from the late 1890s.  There ensued a lengthy 
period of disappointing total returns until the market in domestic railway securities 
stabilised around 1910. 
 
IV 
 
Far from considering the investment merits of domestic railways in isolation, investors 
would have assessed their attractiveness in a diversified portfolio of quoted securities. 
The benefits of spreading investment risk were well understood by late Victorian 
investors thanks to such market commentators as Henry Lowenfeld, a London investment 
advisor and journalist, who wrote extensively about the merits of judiciously diversifying 
one’s investments geographically and across industries.35 Given the considerable change 
in the fortunes of this sector in the late 1890s, how might a rational investor have 
reassessed exposure to railway securities in such a diversified portfolio?  
                                                 
35
 Lowenfeld, Investment. 
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We can estimate the composition of an optimal portfolio of a late Victorian investor by 
employing the tools of modern portfolio theory. The starting point of this theory is the 
assumption that investors possess mean-variance preferences. In other words, they care 
only about the expected return, defined by mean return, and the risk, defined by variance, 
of any investment in assembling a portfolio.36 Furthermore, investors prefer more return 
and less risk.  
 
The decision as to which portfolio chosen from the many securities available is optimal 
can then be analyzed in two stages. Firstly, we identify the minimum variance frontier, 
which is the hyperbola in Figure 2, and represents those portfolios with the lowest risk for 
a given level of return. In other words, each point on this curve is associated with a set of 
weights, iw , for a subset of i securities chosen from the investment universe, where these 
weights minimize the portfolio variance for a given level of portfolio expected return (µ). 
Formally, it is the solution to the following quadratic programme: 
 
 Min   ijjijip ww σσ ΣΣ=
2
 
 subject to  µ=Σ iii rw  
 and  1=Σ ii w  
The efficient frontier is that part of the hyperbola which lies above the minimum variance 
portfolio (MVP). The intuition here is that any investor will do better to diversify his or 
her wealth across a basket of securities, thereby reducing risk for a given target return. 
This process will result in a portfolio represented by a point on the efficient frontier.  
 
At the second stage, we identify which portfolio on the efficient frontier investors should 
choose by assuming that any investor’s objective is to maximize return for a given level 
of risk. Investors are interested in the portfolio return achieved in excess of the 
benchmark risk-free asset, such as Consols, which earns a risk-free return. This objective 
is graphically represented by the line, known as the capital allocation line (CAL), which 
intersects the y-axis at the risk-free rate ( fr ) and forms a point of tangency (P) with the 
efficient frontier. The slope of this line is equivalent to the expected return on the 
portfolio (µ) in excess of the risk-free return ( fr ) relative to the standard deviation of the 
portfolio return (σp). This is the Sharpe ratio, and is expressed algebraically as: 
 
p
f
p
r
S
σ
µ −
=  
                                                 
36
 This theory was originated by Markowitz, Portfolio selection. An accessible textbook introduction to 
portfolio optimization is Bodie, Kane and Marcus, Investments, ch.7.  
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The ratios for the various securities and the optimal portfolio are graphed in Figure 3.  As 
might be expected, the risk-reward trade-off is most attractive for the portfolio.  Also note 
that the highest ratio among the domestic railway securities, RAIL(MAX), is exceeded by 
that of the foreign railway debenture sector, WRAIL, and by the mean ratio for all non-
domestic railway sectors, NON-RAIL(MEAN), after the turn of the century. 
 
The optimization problem confronting the rational investor now becomes: 
 Max   
p
f
p
r
S
σ
µ −
=  
subject to  1=Σ ii w   
and  0≥iw  (short sale constraint) 
 
where wi.is the weight of the ith security in the portfolio. Again the solution generates a 
set of weights, *iw , of those securities comprising the optimal portfolio, P. These weights 
are the optimal weights 
 
Furthermore, according to the fund separation theorem, any investor is able to hold any 
linear combination of the risk-free asset and the optimal portfolio P, as described by the 
CAL.37 Risk-averse investors will choose a point on this line to the south-west of the 
tangency point, P, and in the extreme case would hold just the risk-free asset, Consols. 
Risk-loving investors, on the other hand would borrow to invest in the optimal portfolio P 
and locate themselves somewhere on the same line but to the north-east of point P. 
Investors do not need to vary the individual security holdings within their optimal 
portfolio to take account of their risk preferences, but simply shift the proportion of their 
wealth that they allocate to the optimal portfolio, P.  
 
The intuition of this second stage is that the particular point on the efficient frontier 
chosen by the investor represents exactly that portfolio which maximizes his or her return 
in excess of the risk-free asset for the risk taken. The optimal portfolio, P, has the highest 
Sharpe ratio given the expected returns, variances and covariances of all the securities, or 
assets, available to investors. A security has two chances to get into the optimal portfolio. 
The higher its return relative to other securities, the more likely it will be selected. In 
addition, the lower the contribution made to portfolio risk, the more likely it will make 
the cut. Hence, in the case of individual domestic railways, modest return expectations 
might be compensated by their diversifying advantages when added to a portfolio. 
 
                                                 
37
 This optimal portfolio P is known as the market portfolio since it represents the aggregate portfolio of 
securities held by all investors under the standard CAPM assumptions. 
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Goetzmann and Ukhov applied such a theoretical framework in examining how investors 
would have diversified their portfolios in the 1870-1913 period across a total of 19 
domestic and foreign broad asset classes.38 Building on Edelstein’s earlier finding that on 
a risk-adjusted basis investors were more than adequately compensated for investing 
overseas, and using the same sample, the authors concluded that British investors 
behaved rationally in acting on these attractive returns and allocating a large portion of 
their wealth to foreign assets. 
 
More relevant to our line of enquiry, they found that rational investors on the eve of WWI 
would have made absolutely no allocation to the domestic railway sector at all.39 This is, 
perhaps, unsurprising given the substantial deterioration in railway returns from the late 
1890s onwards, both relative to the benchmark asset, Consols, as discussed above, and to 
other sectors. Average returns of railway ordinary and preference shares were the poorest 
amongst domestic sectors with the exception of the insignificant Canals and Docks, and 
were considerably below those on foreign railway shares.40 Railway debenture returns, 
although in line with other domestic sector returns, were inferior to foreign debenture 
returns by a considerable margin.  
 
We wish to pin down the implications of declining railway profitability for portfolio 
choice more precisely. Accordingly, we disaggregate the domestic railway asset classes 
into their constituent securities, and consider which individual railway securities a 
rational investor would have held as part of an optimal portfolio, given the considerable 
cross-sectional variation in total returns described above and we seek to identify the point 
at which this investor would have begun to reduce exposure to domestic railways in such 
a portfolio. 
 
We assume that late Victorian investors had mean-variance preferences, were unable to 
sell short, and maximized their portfolio’s Sharpe ratio. The available investment 
universe comprised 7 domestic asset classes, excluding the domestic railway sector, and 8 
foreign asset classes, as represented by the Edelstein sample. This part of the sample is 
similar to that utilized by Goetzmann and Ukhov.41 In place of the 3 domestic railway 
asset classes, we substituted the 32 domestic railway securities, consisting of 14 ordinary 
                                                 
38
 Goetzmann and Ukhov, 'British investment'. 
39
 Ibid., Table XI, Panel A. In fact, Panel B shows that had they been able to do so, investors would have 
been substantial short sellers of the domestic railway ordinary share asset class. 
40
 Ibid., Tables IX, X and XI. 
41
 Ibid.. The 7 domestic asset classes are the ordinary shares of domestic Banking and Finance, Light 
Industry and Commerce, Heavy Industry, and Infrastructure, the preference shares of domestic 
Manufacturing and Commerce, and the debentures of domestic Municipals, and Infrastructure. We excluded 
the domestic industrial debenture sector because there were too many missing observations. The 8 foreign 
asset classes are the ordinary shares of foreign Railways, Banking and Finance, Infrastructure, and Tea and 
Coffee Plantations, and the debentures of Colonial Governments, Colonial Municipals, foreign Railways, 
and foreign Infrastructure. 
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shares, 6 preference shares and 12 debentures, (see Appendices 1 and 2). This makes a 
total of 47 assets available for investment.42 
 
Given the expected real returns, the variances and the co-variances of these 47 assets, we 
estimate the weights allocated to individual domestic railway securities given that rational 
investors maximized their portfolio return per unit of risk, or the portfolio’s Sharpe ratio. 
We assume investors required at least fifteen years of returns history in order to formulate 
their returns expectations. Portfolios are then optimized for various periods, all of which 
start in 1870, and end in any year between 1884 and 1913, as we extend one year at a time 
the period over which an investor computed his return expectations. The detail of the 
optimization procedure is described in Appendix 2.  
 
The weights of each railway security included in the optimal portfolio are summarized in 
Table 8. There is a mixture of ordinary and preference shares and debentures, although 
ordinary shares predominate. Some of the weights such as the debenture holdings other 
than those of  London Chatham and Dover (LDCRDB) and London and North Western 
(LNWRDB) in certain years are very small and insignificantly different from zero as 
indicated by the bootstrap standard errors in brackets. Overall, the railway portfolio 
holdings chime with our estimates of railway economic returns. Long-term holdings 
included the ordinary shares of London and South Western (LSWR), London Brighton 
and South Coast (LBSCR) and London and North Western (LNWR) all of which featured 
among the stronger economic performers in the sector. The largest holding was the 
LSWR ordinary share which occupied almost 15% of the portfolio in the period to 1897-
98.  Although the ordinary shares of a poor economic performer such as MSLR (GCR) 
were included in the portfolio the holdings were extremely small and not statistically 
significantly different from zero. 
 
Edelstein concluded that foreign assets earned superior risk-adjusted returns, and that 
domestic railway ordinary shares were a particularly poor investment.43 However, this 
was the position looking back from 1913. Our analysis enables us to look at how the 
investment environment evolved in the years leading up to 1913. Summing our results for 
individual railway security weights in the optimal portfolio for each period (RAIL, Table 
8), a clear picture of the decline in the domestic railway allocation emerges (Figure 4). 
The total weight begins at approximately the 15% level in 1884, rising to a peak of 43% 
in 1892, thereafter falling away sharply to around 5% just before WW1.44 In contrast, the 
                                                 
42
 The results from including Taff Vale Railway ordinary shares in the investment universe are summarized 
in Appendix 3. Of course, it would be preferable to include all individual securities in all sectors in the 
optimisations which follow. However, the considerable problems of data collection and computational 
complexity unfortunately rule this out.  It is our contention that this restriction will tend to bias our results in 
favour of an allocation to railways other things being equal. Allowing an investor to choose a portfolio from 
the entire market of individual securities would be more likely to include individual non-rail securities with 
risk-return chararacteristics more attractive than those of the non-rail sectors which are just simple averages 
of their constituent securities. 
43
 Edelstein, Overseas investment, pp.135. 
44
 Our optimization results for the whole period 1870-1913 are similar to those of Goetzmann and Uhkov 
and omit domestic railways in favour of foreign railways. Although we adopt a slightly different procedure 
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allocation to foreign railway securities, largely comprising debentures, increased steadily 
from a level of 9% for the period ended 1884 to above 35% on the eve of WW1 (WRAIL, 
Table 8). Thus, in contrast to Edelstein’s findings, the rational investor would have 
selected a portfolio with some, albeit modest, exposure to domestic railways in 1913. 
Furthermore, when considering the earlier period not dealt with by Edelstein, investors 
would have allocated funds to domestic railways well in excess of those to foreign 
railways up to the late 1890s.45 
 
Whilst we have focused on deteriorating returns as the main determinant of the decline in 
the domestic railway weighting, the risk-reward characteristics of these securities were 
unable to rescue the situation. As we saw in Figure 3 above, the highest Sharpe ratio 
provided by the most attractive domestic railway security fell below those available from 
other assets and also from foreign railway debentures after the late 1890s.   
 
The question arises as to whether the subsequent decline in the weighting of domestic 
railways in the optimal portfolio is driven by the deterioration in their returns or an 
improvement in other returns.  The previous discussion of the pattern of returns would 
suggest the problem lay in the deterioration of railway returns.  Whereas the simple 
average of  annual domestic railway returns fell sharply from the 5 and 6 per cent level to 
nothing, real returns in other sectors declined by only 1.5 percentage points to 6.2 per cent 
in the period 1898-1913 from 7.7 per cent in 1870-1897. To confirm this view, we 
constrain the mean return for each domestic railway security in 1898-1913 to fall by the 
same margin of 1.5 percentage points compared to the earlier period and leave standard 
deviations and correlations unchanged. We then re-run the optimization procedure for the 
whole period to 1914.  In this counterfactual case, the total domestic railway weighting 
would have amounted to over 50 per cent.  It would appear that poor domestic railway 
returns rather than improvement in the returns of other sectors led to the downgrading of 
their importance in the optimal portfolio. Furthermore, this shortfall in domestic railway 
returns was costly.  Investors had to forgo an extra 1% of annualised return for the same 
level of risk.46   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
from them (see Appendix 2), the non-railway sector weights are also similar to those of the top 3 ranked 
portfolios in their constrained case, ‘British investment’, pp.289-290, Table X, Panel A. 
45
 Our results are not sensitive to the use of 1870 as the base date for the formation of return expectations.  
If we suppose that investors formed their expectations at any time based solely on the previous 20 years 
experience, then the evolution of the resulting domestic railway weighting in the optimal portfolio over time 
is similar to that portrayed in Figure 4, with the exception that the weightings are higher throughout. 
Beginning around the 30% level in 1890, the weighting peaked at slightly over 60% in 1897 and declined to 
15% in 1913. We prefer to report full results in the main body of the paper based on the returns from 1870 
because of the longer run of data that is available in estimating optimal portfolios from 1890 onwards. 
46
 Hence, assuming this counterfactual of higher domestic railway returns in 1898-1913, the rational 
investor in 1913 can select an optimal portfolio with a better Sharpe Ratio, rising from 1.34 to 1.57. 
Applying the latter ratio to the level of portfolio risk originally chosen by investors and adding the risk-free 
rate, their expected annual return would rise to 8.8 per cent from the 7.8 per cent previously anticipated. 
Intuitively, this exercise shifts the efficient frontier in Figure 2 to the north-east, and the estimated 
incremental return of 1 per cent represents the vertical shift in the plot of the optimal portfolio (P) whilst 
holding portfolio risk on the x-axis constant.  
  
 
19 
The poor relative price performance of railway securities after 1897 indicates that some 
investors did sell their railway holdings. Phoenix Assurance, for example, reduced its 
domestic railway weighting from 10% in 1890 to 2.6% in 1900, and then to 1.3% in 
1913.47 Some investors, however, were effectively forced to retain their railway 
securities, in particular those whose activities were governed by the Trustee Acts which 
severely restricted the type of security in which guardians of “widow and orphan” savings 
could invest.   
 
Other investors, particularly those focused on past dividends, may have delayed revising 
their return expectations downwards, preferring to cling to the belief that railway 
securities after 1898 would bounce back and do just as well as they had in the earlier part 
of this pre-1913 period. Thus, in 1901, The Economist counseled its readers as follows: 
 
“When all is said, however, it is hard to believe that the prosperity of British railways is a 
thing of the past, or even that a permanent reduction of dividends of more than moderate 
extent is to be regarded as inevitable.”48 
 
The most vociferous critic of the domestic railway sector was The Investors’ Review, as 
widely regarded as the Investor’s Monthly Manual, and carrying far more financial 
commentary. This journal bemoaned the inability of railway management to control 
capital expenditures and working expenses, and their general lack of business acumen.49 
Yet, as late as 1909, the magazine despaired of the vast majority of investors investing the 
time and effort to understand the degree of mismanagement taking place.50 
 
Notwithstanding this selling, domestic railways still accounted for 20% of the entire 
London market in 1913, half their index weighting in 1870.51 One implication of the 
foregoing analysis is that investors would have been well advised to have rapidly reduced 
their exposure to railways from the late 1890s onwards and in aggregate remained 
somewhat overexposed to domestic railways on the eve of WW1. However, having seen 
                                                 
47Trebilcock, Phoenix Assurance, Table 1.6, pp.73. 
48
 The Economist, “Are Home Railway Stocks Cheap?” 17 August, 1901, pp.1238. 
49
 The Investors’ Review, “The Home Railway Position”, 17 February, 1906, pp.199: “We cannot look at 
such figures without feeling that there is a lack of business perspicacity in the management of our railways. 
They are still amateurish in many respects, presided over by great landowners and gentlemen of 
means….and the presiding directorate too frequently stands in the way of thorough reform, of good account 
keeping, of careful husbandry in finance.” See also “State Ownership of the Railways”, 15 February, 1908, 
pp.205, poor management “is tending to reduce the railways to a state of unprofitableness unexampled in 
the history of this branch of modern scientific development in any other part of the world”. 
50
 The Investors’ Review, “Why Home Rails Refuse to Rise”, 29 September, 1909, pp.363: “Even now we 
doubt if one railway shareholder in five thousand has really taken the trouble to master what a loose and 
free and easy treatment of the capital account is coming to mean to him.” 
51
 This weighting applies to all three security types and is estimated from the Stock Exchange Daily Official 
List figures quoted in Michie, The London Stock Exchange, Table 3.3. British government and foreign 
government stocks, as the risk-free asset, are excluded. Any change in weights, of course, reflects both the 
relative amount of new issues as well as relative price changes. In the case of ordinary shares alone, the 
railway sector, including sterling-denominated foreign railway shares, represented 15% of the total equity 
market in 1913, compared to 76% in 1870, Grossman, New Indices, Table 1. 
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the sector de-rated and the dividend yield recover in the first decade of the new century, 
investors did witness the ordinary shares revert towards their mean long-run performance 
and deliver a more attractive return of almost 4% per annum between 1910 and 1913. 
Hence, a second implication is that having shunned these shares in the late 1890s when 
their ratings were propelled by the irrational exuberance of others, the well-informed 
investor would have waited until dividend yields had returned to a level at which 
investment once more became attractive in the years immediately preceding WW1. 
 
Nevertheless, it seems clear that the weight given to domestic railway securities by a 
rational investor would have been considerably lower in 1913 than in 1897.  During the 
intervening years railway shareholders had a bad time as the longer-run consequences of 
declining ROCE were reflected in negative returns. As argued in section II and 
notwithstanding the bottoming out of railway security prices in the run-up to WW1, the 
scope for management to instil investor confidence by further addressing cost 
inefficiencies was extremely limited by 1910.  Consequently, the portfolio options 
available to investors had been significantly diminished by the difficulties that beset 
railway profitability in the late Victorian and Edwardian periods. 
 
V 
 
This section discusses the railways' profitability record in terms of the quality of resource 
allocation in the British economy.  The private return on capital expenditure is compared 
with the cost of capital and the social rate of return.  Finally, the implications of cost 
inefficiency are considered in the context of the long-standing debate about 
entrepreneurial failure. 
 
Investments are justified if they cover the cost of capital.  This can be written as 
 
   CC  =  λ(rf + dp)  +  (1 − λ)(rf  +  βrp)                                                                      (5) 
 
where CC is the weighted-average cost of capital, dp is the debt premium λ is the gearing 
level, rf is the risk-free interest rate, rp is the equity risk premium and β is the ratio of the 
covariance of the returns on the company's shares with those of the overall market 
divided by the variance of the market returns. 
 
The data used above to analyze portfolio decisions suggest that average values for these 
variables are dp = 1.5, rf = 2.5, λ = 0.3, β = 1.  Estimates of the equity risk premium tend 
to be lower than once was the case and 4 per cent is perhaps a reasonable assumption.52  
This implies that the average cost of capital for the railway sector was 5.75 per cent 
which is fairly similar to the costs of capital allowed by regulators of UK privatized 
utilities nowadays who generally have used similar values for the key parameters.53 
 
                                                 
52
 Cf. Dimson et al., 'The worldwide equity premium'. 
53
 Jenkinson, 'Regulation'. 
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The estimates reported in Tables 1 and 2 indicate that, with the exception of the Taff Vale 
Railway, the benchmark of 5.75 per cent for ROCE was not reached after the mid-1870s.  
Indeed, the rate of return for the sector as a whole fell below 5 per cent in the early 1890s 
and did not regain this level.  This is consistent with the suggestion that investment in the 
sector had turned out to be excessive, especially since by the end of our period there was 
no scope to reach the benchmark by addressing issues of cost inefficiency.  This does not, 
however, necessarily imply that part of the railway network should have been shut down 
straightaway.  Given that the fixed costs of capital had been incurred, continued operation 
was justified as long as variable costs were covered. 
 
In any case, in evaluating the contribution of railways to the British economy it is 
important to consider the social rate of return which was much greater than the private 
ROCE.  In this context the appropriate comparison is with the social discount rate.  The 
average social rate of return can be written as 
 
    Social Saving  +  Net Revenue  + Net Externalities                                                    (6) 
                Cumulated Capital Expenditure 
 
This formula recognizes the value of lower transport costs to users captured by the social 
savings, i.e., consumer surplus gains from cheaper and faster transportation.  Given the 
relative stability of returns, an evaluation of this expression for 1890 will serve our 
purpose.54 
 
The additional information that is required is for the social savings.  For passenger 
services this is provided by Leunig who took account both of monetary and time savings 
and also of the price elasticity of demand.  His estimates is that the passenger social 
savings was 4.4 per cent of GDP in 1890, i.e., £68.6 mn.55  The starting point for freight 
social savings is the estimate made by Hawke for 1865.56 
 
The mid-point of Hawke's estimate for the freight social saving was 3.2 per cent of GDP 
in 1865.  This was an upper bound estimate which assumed a zero price elasticity of 
demand.  Fogel suggested that this overestimates the true social savings by 24 per cent.57  
Accepting this correction, implies a freight social saving of £26.8 mn. for Britain in 1865.  
This can be converted into an estimate for 1890 by taking account of the extra volume of 
traffic in the latter year and the further reduction in transport costs in line with TFP 
growth.58  The latter is taken to be 0.8 per cent per year in line with the estimates given by 
Crafts et al.59  This results in a freight social savings of £72.8 million in 1890, i.e., 5.0 per 
cent of GDP. 
                                                 
54
 McClelland, 'Social rates'.  There is no quantitative evidence on externalities so we disregard them.  In 
view of the estimates presented below, this is unlikely to be a serious omission. 
55
 Leunig, 'Time is money', figure 6; data kindly supplied by the author. 
56
 Hawke, Railways and economic growth, p. 188. 
57
 Fogel, 'Notes', pp. 11-12.  This correction is based on an elasticity of demand of 0.4 and a ratio of 
alternative transport costs to rail transport costs of 2.64. 
58
 As is noted by Foreman-Peck, 'Railways', p. 77. 
59
 Crafts et al., 'Total factor productivity', p. 618. 
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Thus, the average social rate of return on railways in 1890 was 28.6 per cent based on a 
total social saving of £141.4 mn. plus (from Table 1) net revenue of £31.5 mn. compared 
with cumulated capital expenditure of £603.8 mn.  This is a classic example of a 
technological innovation whose benefits accrue to consumers rather than proprietors.60  
The implication is that on average railways were a great investment from society's point 
of view, if not for the private investors who financed them. 
 
The standard formula for the social discount rate is 
 
   SDR  =  δ  +  ηg                                                                                                         (7) 
 
where δ is the rate of pure time preference, g is the rate of growth of real consumption per 
person and η is the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption with respect to the 
growth of consumption.  HM Treasury works with an SDR of 3.5 per cent for today's UK 
based on δ = 1.5, η = 1, and g = 2.61  Other writers suggest that η = 1 is too low and SDR 
= 6 per cent is probably more appropriate and more consistent with observed savings 
behaviour.62  Then again, g = 2 would be on the high side for Victorian Britain.  In any 
case, there is no real doubt that the average social rate of return on railways far exceeded 
their opportunity cost. 
 
That said, railways could have been better managed and the average social rate of return 
could have been higher.  The estimates above do not rule out the possibility that marginal 
railway investment projects were undertaken that did not produce an adequate social 
return - the Great Central extension of its main line to London may well be a case in 
point.  And, the evidence presented above in section II was that, at times, cost inefficiency 
was a serious problem. 
 
To illustrate this last point, consider the median level of cost inefficiency across these 
railway companies in 1900 of 10.2 per cent.  This implies that capital employed could 
have been about £84.6 mn. lower and operating expenditure about £5.7 mn., or 0.3 per 
cent of GDP, lower.  If this capital had been deployed elsewhere in the economy it would 
have raised the overall capital stock by about 2.4 per cent and, using a standard output 
elasticity of 0.33, GDP by about 0.8 per cent.63  Thus, losses from railway inefficiency, 
amounted to a little over 1 per cent of GDP in 1900. 
 
                                                 
60
 In the last half of the twentieth century, it has been estimated that supernormal profits averaged only 
about 2 per cent of social gains from innovation with the remainder passed to consumers through lower 
prices; see W. D. Nordhaus, 'Schumpeterian profits in the American economy: theory and measurement', 
NBER Working paper No. 10433 (2004). 
61
 HM Treasury, The Green Book, annex 6. 
62
 Weitzman, ‘The Stern Review'.  The optimal savings rate based on equation (7) = (r − δ)/ηr which for 
HM Treasury's parameters would imply 57 per cent!. 
63
 Calculations based on aggregate capital stock estimate in Feinstein, 'National statistics', p. 428. 
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Railways are an important qualification to the general exoneration of British management 
in this period that was proffered by the new economic historians.64  The railway sector 
was characterized by a separation of ownership from control in which shareholders were 
weak, high barriers to entry and weak regulation at least prior to the freeze on freight 
charges.  There was ample scope for management to fail at least until profits became too 
low for comfort in the early twentieth century.  The neoclassical exoneration was largely 
based on investigations of industries where managers were exposed to much greater 
competition than was the case in railways.65 
 
VI 
 
So how good was the profitability of the major British railway companies in the years 
before World War I?  In this paper, we have established several important new results 
which distinguish the profitability of the businesses from the returns to shareholders and 
the value of the railway in terms of a social cost-benefit analysis.  Our main findings are 
as follows. 
 
First, on the basis of cumulated capital expenditure, the return on capital employed fell 
from an average of 5.6 per cent in the early 1870s to about 4.5 per cent in the early 1900s 
after which it stabilized.  After starting out at a level that was probably quite close to the 
cost of capital, the railway industry persistently failed to produce the required returns.  
This was the typical company experience but some companies had very low profitability 
throughout, e.g., London, Chatham and Dover. 
 
Second, cost inefficiency was considerable in the 1890s and, had this been eliminated, 
most companies would have delivered a return on capital employed over 5 per cent.  By 
the end of our period, there was no longer a possibility of achieving adequate returns from 
squeezing out inefficiency. The high level of cost inefficiency in the 1890s is 
symptomatic of a combination of weak competition, weak shareholders, and weak 
regulation in a non-traded service sector. 
 
Third, returns to security holders were quite attractive before the late 1890s.  An optimal 
portfolio analysis indicates that a rational investor would have wanted a substantial 
weight in domestic railway securities - our estimate is that around 40 per cent would have 
been justified in the mid-1890s.  Thereafter downward pressure on profitability was 
reflected by a de-rating of share values which inflicted capital losses on shareholders and 
a rapid rush to the exits would have been appropriate around the turn of the century. 
 
Fourth, these outcomes are rather less bad than earlier writers have claimed.  Our 
estimates of return on capital employed are generally around 1 percentage point higher 
than those recently published by Arnold and McCartney for a similar sample of 
companies.66  While both Edelstein and Goetzmann and Ukhov concluded that investors 
                                                 
64
 McCloskey and Sandberg, 'From damnation to redemption'. 
65
 For a fuller discussion of this point see Crafts et al., 'Were British railway companies'. 
66
 Arnold and McCartney, 'Rates of return'. 
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should have held no domestic railway securities in 1913 period, we find that up to the late 
1890s a sizeable holding would have been appropriate for these assets and that following 
a substantial decline investors would still have retained a very modest exposure to 
domestic railways in 1913. Nonetheless, overall investment returns could have been 
measurably better for investors had these stocks only suffered a fall in real returns in line 
with other sectors in the period after 1897. 
 
Finally, it is clear that, on average, railway investments delivered a high social rate of 
return - our estimate for 1890 is a rate in excess of 25 per cent.  The reason for this is that 
the consumer surplus gains of transport users which accrued from cheaper and faster 
transport than was available from other modes dwarfed the profits available to be 
distributed to the owners of the railway companies.  So, even though there was indeed 
waste and inefficiency on British railways in the late nineteenth century, nevertheless 
their contribution to economic welfare was massive. 
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Table 1.  Return on Capital Employed: All 15 Companies 
 Adjusted Cumulated Net % return 5-Year % return 5-year 
 Paid-Up Capital Traffic Paid-Up Moving Capital Moving 
 Capital Expenditure Revenue Capital Basis Average Expenditure Basis Average 
1870 400549 361929 19646.0 4.90  5.43  
1871 412017 373585 21710.3 5.27  5.81  
1872 428946 389639 22720.5 5.30 5.11 5.83 5.63 
1873 443372 401961 22769.3 5.14 5.13 5.66 5.64 
1874 459202 417609 22651.9 4.93 5.05 5.42 5.58 
1875 477197 433163 23819.8 4.99 4.95 5.50 5.49 
1876 505173 450441 24670.5 4.88 4.88 5.48 5.43 
1877 519964 464676 25107.9 4.83 4.83 5.40 5.39 
1878 534625 479064 25528.8 4.78 4.82 5.33 5.39 
1879 547911 489690 25661.0 4.68 4.82 5.24 5.38 
1880 555461 498916 27395.4 4.93 4.84 5.49 5.39 
1881 565516 509121 27612.1 4.88 4.87 5.42 5.42 
1882 578793 519559 28440.7 4.91 4.89 5.47 5.43 
1883 589510 533070 29118.7 4.94 4.83 5.46 5.35 
1884 600980 544560 28821.0 4.80 4.78 5.29 5.27 
1885 609431 556450 28304.5 4.64 4.73 5.09 5.19 
1886 617302 564385 28478.4 4.61 4.70 5.05 5.14 
1887 622509 572956 29113.8 4.68 4.74 5.08 5.16 
1888 632304 582170 30202.1 4.78 4.78 5.19 5.18 
1889 637104 591857 31761.6 4.99 4.81 5.37 5.19 
1890 651308 603782 31530.7 4.84 4.80 5.22 5.16 
1891 656014 618368 31364.8 4.78 4.44 5.07 4.76 
1892 675906 630362 31053.6 4.59 4.35 4.93 4.65 
1893 686224 642049 20661.4 3.01 4.29 3.22 4.58 
1894 697654 653659 31557.5 4.52 4.29 4.83 4.58 
1895 707484 663228 32326.4 4.57 4.32 4.87 4.59 
1896 712864 671616 33945.2 4.76 4.64 5.05 4.92 
1897 724770 688026 34355.0 4.74 4.67 4.99 4.93 
1898 738433 702944 34188.4 4.63 4.64 4.86 4.87 
1899 749680 718937 34980.7 4.67 4.53 4.87 4.73 
1900 763695 734977 33669.3 4.41 4.46 4.58 4.65 
1901 778536 749808 32802.3 4.21 4.41 4.37 4.58 
1902 794616 762344 34793.8 4.38 4.34 4.56 4.51 
1903 806370 780201 35278.5 4.37 4.34 4.52 4.51 
1904 818790 787999 35598.2 4.35 4.39 4.52 4.56 
1905 825358 797356 36391.1 4.41 4.41 4.56 4.57 
1906 837313 805144 37308.6 4.46 4.38 4.63 4.55 
1907 845157 815396 37636.0 4.45 4.39 4.62 4.55 
1908 852528 821531 36128.3 4.24 4.42 4.40 4.58 
1909 857390 827223 37553.3 4.38 4.45 4.54 4.61 
1910 860097 829634 39253.1 4.56 4.46 4.73 4.62 
1911 860982 833405 39866.1 4.63  4.78  
1912 866439 843596 39075.9 4.51  4.63  
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Notes: the 15 companies are those that provided the fullest detail in the Railway Returns and were 
thus able to be subjected to the cost efficiency analysis reported in section IV.  They are Caledonian 
(CR), Great Eastern (GER), Great Northern (GNR), Great Western (GWR), Lancashire & Yorkshire 
(LYR)London & North Western (LNWR), London & South Western (LSWR), London, Brighton & 
South Coast (LBSCR), London, Chatham and Dover (LCDR), Manchester, Sheffield & 
Lincolnshire (MSLR) which became Great Central (GCR) in 1897, Midland (MR), North British 
(NBR), North Eastern (NER), South Eastern (SER), Taff Vale (TVR).  These railways comprise 
about three quarters of the route miles in operation at the end of the period. 
Sources: net traffic revenue from Railway Returns, paid-up capital and capital expenditures from 
the companies’ accounts.  These were extracted by Brian Mitchell in 1962/3 in connection with a 
Cambridge University Department of Applied Economics project on long-term capital formation in 
the U.K. directed by Phyllis Deane.  Aggregates of capital expenditure based on them were 
published in Mitchell, “The Coming”, and were incorporated in Feinstein, National Income but the 
individual company data were not then published.   The accounts, in large leather-bound volumes, 
were held at that time in the British Transport Commission Historical Archives in London, York 
and Edinburgh.  These are now held in either the Public Record Office or the National Archives of 
Scotland. 
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Table 2.  Rates of Return on Capital Employed 
(5-year moving average centred on year shown %) 
 
A) Adjusted Paid-Up Capital of All Lines Worked Basis 
 
 1872 1877 1882 1887 1892 1897 1902 1907 1910 
CR 4.73 4.78 4.29 4.38 4.14 4.48 4.07 3.93 3.89 
GER 3.62 3.62 4.00 4.16 3.96 4.33 4.17 4.17 4.00 
GNR 5.86 5.03 5.12 5.09 4.72 4.51 4.28 4.40 4.49 
GWR 5.00 4.47 4.67 4.67 4.64 4.59 4.52 4.61 4.73 
LYR 6.23 5.20 4.61 4.14 3.95 4.24 3.78 3.92 3.97 
LNWR 6.23 5.52 5.64 5.35 5.17 5.33 4.84 4.97 5.11 
LSWR 5.12 5.34 5.11 4.86 5.05 5.28 4.80 4.77 4.73 
LBSCR 3.80 4.45 4.31 5.08 5.31 5.26 4.74 4.65 4.72 
LCDR 1.75 2.11 2.40 2.34 2.43 2.73 2.70 2.67 2.84 
MSLR 5.01 5.12 5.11 4.83 4.41 3.54 3.09 3.53 3.67 
MR 5.85 5.31 5.34 5.17 5.02 4.99 4.56 4.48 4.69 
NBR 3.56 4.14 4.15 4.40 4.12 4.51 4.57 4.36 4.29 
NER 6.17 5.47 5.78 4.96 5.19 5.13 4.91 5.15 5.21 
SER 4.56 4.99 4.96 4.80 4.53 4.47 3.46 3.38 3.59 
TVR 7.61 7.30 9.05 8.01 5.93 5.78 5.92 6.57 6.24 
 
 
B) Cumulated Capital Expenditure of All Lines Worked Basis 
 
 1872 1877 1882 1887 1892 1897 1902 1907 1910 
CR 5.31 5.19 4.65 4.65 4.37 4.60 4.09 3.88 3.79 
GER 3.90 3.88 4.08 4.03 3.88 4.29 4.14 4.16 3.97 
GNR 5.46 4.77 4.82 4.75 4.49 4.32 4.11 4.19 4.25 
GWR 5.03 4.65 4.80 4.81 4.68 4.52 4.41 4.43 4.54 
LYR 6.31 5.24 4.68 4.17 3.99 4.24 3.75 3.87 3.90 
LNWR 6.15 5.56 5.65 5.29 5.06 5.18 4.68 4.76 4.87 
LSWR 4.97 5.17 4.90 4.61 4.77 4.96 4.54 4.44 4.42 
LBSCR 4.41 5.02 4.81 4.86 5.05 5.08 4.44 4.35 4.36 
LCDR 2.03 2.54 2.85 2.78 2.87 3.17 3.05 3.08 3.33 
MSLR 5.33 5.31 5.24 4.90 4.40 3.48 2.88 3.34 3.53 
MR 5.94 5.42 5.53 5.32 5.19 5.09 4.55 4.40 4.54 
NBR 3.58 4.18 4.19 4.38 3.99 4.20 4.24 4.03 3.97 
NER 6.19 5.38 5.66 4.80 4.75 4.79 4.46 4.59 4.61 
SER 4.53 4.91 4.80 4.63 4.34 4.30 3.32 3.26 3.46 
TVR 6.73 6.37 8.04 7.24 5.40 5.21 5.37 5.82 5.49 
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C) Own Paid-Up Capital Including Nominal Additions and Deductions 
 
 1872 1877 1882 1887 1892 1897 1902 1907 1910 
CR 5.19 4.66 3.86 3.90 3.82 3.66 3.23 3.15 3.08 
GER 4.17 4.01 4.15 4.19 3.97 4.34 4.03 4.05 3.90 
GNR 5.70 4.72 4.58 4.37 3.75 3.47 3.34 3.42 3.48 
GWR 5.32 5.40 5.55 5.54 5.33 5.07 4.92 5.10 5.30 
LYR 6.20 5.24 4.55 4.11 3.90 3.74 3.29 3.43 3.46 
LNWR 6.76 5.62 5.19 5.00 4.75 4.72 4.36 4.49 4.63 
LSWR 5.42 5.50 4.86 4.54 4.57 4.38 4.00 3.81 3.72 
LBSCR 4.01 4.99 4.94 5.06 5.34 5.37 5.02 4.99 5.08 
LCDR 1.89 2.16 2.40 2.34 2.42 2.73 2.69 2.68 2.83 
MSLR 4.83 3.89 3.90 3.80 3.51 2.92 2.60 3.08 3.27 
MR 5.91 4.88 4.85 4.48 4.16 3.36 2.43 2.42 2.51 
NBR 3.59 3.85 3.77 3.78 3.27 3.48 3.49 3.29 3.27 
NER 6.20 5.45 5.77 5.01 5.04 4.77 4.45 4.66 4.71 
SER 4.82 5.33 5.24 5.06 4.71 4.71 3.54 3.47 3.71 
TVR 11.89 10.94 10.60 10.49 4.03 4.02 4.26 4.74 4.53 
 
Note: MSLR became GCR from 1897 
Sources: as for Table 1. 
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Table 3.  Cost Inefficiency and ROCE, 1897 (%) 
 
 Cost Actual Counterfactual Counterfactual 
 Inefficiency ROCE ROCE (1) ROCE (2) 
CR 5.0 4.60 4.92 5.18 
GER 5.7 4.29 4.71 5.00 
GNR 8.3 4.32 4.88 5.33 
GWR 14.9 4.52 5.43 6.38 
LYR 3.6 4.24 4.39 4.55 
LNWR 11.7 5.18 6.03 6.83 
LSWR 4.3 4.96 5.47 5.72 
LBSCR 2.5 5.08 5.19 5.32 
LCDR 2.9 3.17 3.29 3.38 
MSLR 19.0 3.48 4.44 5.49 
MR 8.6 5.09 5.77 6.31 
NBR 4.7 4.20 4.40 4.62 
NER 15.1 4.79 5.91 6.96 
SER 2.9 4.30 4.70 4.84 
TVR 29.5 5.21 6.92 9.81 
 
Note: ROCE on cumulated capital expenditure basis. 
Sources: cost inefficiency from estimates made for Crafts et al., 'Were 
British railway companies', ROCE from Table 2 and counterfactual 
ROCE (1) based on adjusted profitability if cost inefficiency in operating 
expenditures eliminated. and counterfactual ROCE (2) based on adjusted 
profitability if cost inefficiency in both capital and operating expenditures 
eliminated. 
  
 
32 
Table 4.  Cost Inefficiency and ROCE, 1910 (%) 
 
 Cost Actual Counterfactual Counterfactual Counterfactual 
 Inefficiency ROCE ROCE (1) ROCE (2) ROCE (3) 
CR 5.7 4.09 4.11 4.35 3.89 
GER 7.9 4.14 4.90 5.32 4.58 
GNR 2.1 4.11 4.45 4.55 3.56 
GWR 1.4 4.41 4.72 4.79 3.14 
LYR 2.7 3.75 4.11 4.22 3.84 
LNWR 1.2 4.68 5.15 5.22 3.78 
LSWR 3.4 4.54 4.81 4.97 4.43 
LBSCR 6.9 4.44 4.88 5.24 4.93 
LCDR 4.7 3.05 3.65 3.83 3.57 
MSLR 1.7 2.88 3.69 3.75 2.03 
MR 1.7 4.55 4.84 4.92 3.87 
NBR 7.4 4.24 4.40 4.75 4.27 
NER 1.4 4.46 4.76 4.83 3.10 
SER 4.7 3.32 3.85 4.04 3.77 
TVR 1.5 5.37 5.58 5.66 2.69 
 
Note: ROCE on cumulated capital expenditure basis 
Sources: cost inefficiency from estimates made for Crafts et al., Were British railway companies', 
ROCE from Table 2; counterfactual ROCE (1) based on adjusted profitability if cost inefficiency in 
operating expenditures eliminated, counterfactual ROCE (2) based on adjusted profitability if 
inefficiency in both capital and operating expenditures eliminated, counterfactual ROCE (3) based 
on adjusted profitability if cost inefficiency in both capital and operating expenditures returned to 
1897 level. 
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Table 5. Annual Total Returns to Ordinary Shares, Preference Shares and Debenture Stocks 
of British Railways, 1870-1913 
Total returns in real terms are defined as the arithmetic sum of capital returns and the dividend yield 
in real terms for the calendar year. See equation (2) in text. All means are equally-weighted. 
 
A) Railway Ordinary Shares 
    EWMEAN CR GER GNR GWR LYR LNWR LSWR 
1870-1913 MEAN 4.3 4.2 4.2 3.6 5.7 2.6 4.4 4.6 
 STDEV 9.4 13.7 13.3 8.7 13.5 7.9 6.8 7.9 
1870-1897 MEAN 6.7 7.9 7.8 4.9 8.7 4.2 6.6 7.8 
 STDEV 9.7 15.3 14.3 7.8 15.8 7.8 6.3 6.7 
1898-1913 MEAN 0.1 -2.3 -2.2 1.3 0.6 -0.2 0.6 -1.1 
  STDEV 7.4 6.8 8.5 10.0 5.5 7.4 6.3 6.5 
    LBSCR LCDR MSLR MR NBR NER SER TVR 
1870-1913 MEAN 6.6 2.1 2.0 4.7 5.4 4.3 4.2 5.8 
 STDEV 16.1 22.0 20.5 7.8 19.7 8.2 10.9 6.9 
1870-1897 MEAN 10.4 2.9 3.8 6.0 8.4 6.3 7.2 7.3 
 STDEV 18.0 23.3 20.1 6.3 23.0 9.0 9.7 6.9 
1898-1913 MEAN 0.0 0.7 -1.1 2.3 0.3 0.8 -1.2 3.0 
  STDEV 9.4 20.2 21.6 9.6 10.7 5.2 11.0 6.3 
 
B) Railway Preference Shares 
    
EWMEAN GERP GNRP GWRP LNWRP MRP NERP 
1870-1913 MEAN 3.9 4.4 3.9 4.0 3.7 3.8 3.5 
 STDEV 4.5 5.7 4.8 4.7 4.4 4.4 4.2 
1870-1897 MEAN 6.2 7.0 6.2 6.3 5.9 6.0 5.6 
 STDEV 3.6 5.0 4.1 3.9 3.6 3.5 3.4 
1898-1913 MEAN -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 
  STDEV 2.6 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.4 2.7 2.6 
 
C) Railway Debentures 
    
EWMEAN CRDB GERDB GNRDB LYRDB LNWRDB LBSCRDB 
1870-1913 MEAN 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.3 3.4 3.6 3.6 
 STDEV 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.7 4.5 
1870-1897 MEAN 5.8 5.7 5.9 5.4 5.5 5.8 5.8 
 STDEV 3.3 3.4 3.6 3.5 3.6 4.1 3.7 
1898-1913 MEAN -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.2 
  STDEV 2.6 3.0 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.7 2.9 
    
LCDRDB MSLRDB MRDB NBRDB NERDB SERDB CONSOL 
1870-1913 MEAN 3.4 3.7 3.4 3.6 3.4 3.6 2.4 
 STDEV 4.3 4.5 4.4 4.1 4.2 4.5 3.9 
1870-1897 MEAN 5.5 5.6 5.6 5.8 5.5 5.9 4.0 
 STDEV 3.6 3.5 3.7 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.0 
1898-1913 MEAN -0.3 0.3 -0.4 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 
  STDEV 2.6 4.1 2.8 2.3 2.6 3.2 3.6 
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Table 6: Railway ordinary shares: nominal dividends paid (% par value) and nominal dividend yields 
Dividends paid (% par value) are in nominal terms. Means are equally weighted. 
 
A) Nominal Dividends Paid (% par value) – 5 year moving average.  
  MEAN CR GER GNR GWR LYR LNWR LSWR LBSCR LCDR MSLR MR NBR NER SER TVR 
1872 4.6 2.9 0.7 7.0 4.8 7.4 7.3 5.3 2.2 0.0 2.4 6.7 0.0 7.8 4.3 10.4 
1877 4.8 5.6 0.8 5.7 4.0 5.7 6.6 5.6 5.3 0.0 2.5 5.6 1.4 7.1 5.5 11.0 
1882 5.3 3.9 1.7 5.0 5.6 4.9 7.3 5.7 4.8 0.0 2.5 5.9 2.9 7.9 5.5 15.9 
1887 4.7 4.2 2.2 4.5 5.7 3.9 6.6 5.3 4.1 0.0 2.0 5.1 3.1 6.0 4.9 13.6 
1892 4.4 4.3 2.3 3.5 5.9 3.8 6.6 6.0 7.2 0.0 1.9 5.7 0.8 6.2 4.2 7.5 
1897 4.3 4.9 3.0 1.9 5.2 5.0 6.7 6.5 6.5 0.0 0.7 4.7 0.9 6.3 4.5 7.2 
1902 3.6 4.0 3.2 0.9 5.0 4.0 6.0 5.9 4.7 0.0 0.0 2.6 1.5 5.7 2.5 8.4 
1907 3.6 3.5 3.0 1.6 5.3 3.9 6.1 5.8 4.5 0.0 0.0 2.6 0.9 5.7 2.6 8.7 
1911 3.9 3.3 2.7 2.1 5.7 4.1 6.5 5.8 4.4 0.0 0.0 3.4 0.7 6.0 3.5 9.9 
 
B) Nominal Dividend Yields (%) – 5 year moving average. 
  MEAN CR GER GNR GWR LYR LNWR LSWR LBSCR LCDR MSLR MR NBR NER SER TVR 
1872 3.6 2.9 1.6 5.1 4.4 4.9 4.9 4.9 2.7 0.0 3.2 4.8 0.0 4.6 4.2 5.9 
1877 3.7 4.9 1.4 4.6 3.9 4.3 4.5 4.3 4.2 0.0 3.2 4.3 1.0 4.7 4.3 5.6 
1882 3.6 3.7 2.4 4.1 4.1 3.8 4.3 4.3 3.7 0.0 2.9 4.3 1.7 4.6 4.3 5.8 
1887 3.4 3.8 3.2 3.8 3.9 3.4 3.9 3.9 3.2 0.0 2.7 3.8 1.9 3.7 3.8 6.0 
1892 3.1 3.6 2.7 3.0 3.7 3.5 3.8 3.5 4.7 0.0 2.7 3.7 0.5 3.9 3.5 3.9 
1897 2.8 3.2 2.6 3.2 3.1 3.5 3.4 3.0 3.7 0.0 1.5 3.5 0.5 3.6 3.0 3.6 
1902 2.9 3.5 3.3 2.0 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.5 3.8 0.0 0.0 3.9 1.0 3.8 2.7 4.7 
1907 3.2 3.2 4.0 3.5 4.1 4.0 4.2 4.0 4.6 0.0 0.0 4.1 0.6 4.2 3.5 4.4 
1911 3.7 4.1 4.3 4.0 4.7 4.6 4.8 4.5 4.6 0.0 0.0 4.9 0.6 4.8 4.2 5.3 
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Table 7: Decomposition of railway ordinary share returns: real dividend yields, real capital returns and total real returns 
Dividend yields, capital returns and total returns are all expressed in real terms. See equation (2) in text. In the case of LBSCR, NBR, GNR, and 
MR and MSL/GCR, the dividends from 1883, 1888, 1891, and 1897 are those received on deferred ordinary shares. 
 
A) Real Dividend Yields (%) – 5 year moving average. 
  MEAN CR GER GNR GWR LYR LNWR LSWR LBSCR LCDR MSLR MR NBR NER SER TVR 
1872 2.5 1.7 0.4 3.9 3.2 3.8 3.7 3.8 1.6 -1.1 2.1 3.6 -1.1 3.4 3.0 4.8 
1877 5.7 6.9 3.4 6.7 5.9 6.4 6.6 6.4 6.3 2.0 5.2 6.3 3.0 6.8 6.3 7.6 
1882 3.7 3.8 2.5 4.2 4.1 3.9 4.4 4.3 3.8 0.1 3.0 4.4 1.8 4.7 4.4 5.9 
1887 4.1 4.5 3.8 4.5 4.6 4.0 4.5 4.5 3.9 0.6 3.3 4.5 2.6 4.4 4.5 6.6 
1892 3.4 3.9 3.0 3.3 4.0 3.7 4.1 3.7 5.0 0.3 2.9 4.0 0.8 4.2 3.8 4.2 
1897 2.5 3.0 2.4 3.0 2.9 3.2 3.1 2.8 3.4 -0.2 1.3 3.3 0.3 3.3 2.8 3.4 
1902 1.8 2.4 2.2 0.9 2.5 2.4 2.6 2.4 2.7 -1.1 -1.1 2.7 -0.1 2.7 1.5 3.5 
1907 2.7 2.7 3.4 3.0 3.6 3.5 3.7 3.5 4.0 -0.5 -0.5 3.5 0.1 3.6 2.9 3.9 
1911 2.9 3.3 3.4 3.2 3.9 3.8 4.0 3.7 3.8 -0.8 -0.8 4.1 -0.2 3.9 3.4 4.5 
 
B) Real Capital Returns (%) – 5 year moving average. 
  MEAN CR GER GNR GWR LYR LNWR LSWR LBSCR LCDR MSLR MR NBR NER SER TVR 
1872 8.3 8.3 2.9 5.3 17.8 -2.5 4.3 5.0 19.0 14.0 10.5 2.5 17.4 7.1 9.0 4.4 
1877 2.7 3.1 9.0 -2.0 0.7 -1.9 0.2 3.2 8.8 4.3 2.6 0.0 10.1 -1.8 2.6 1.6 
1882 0.3 -0.6 3.3 -1.8 4.3 -1.6 2.3 -1.8 -1.7 -6.7 -1.4 -0.4 4.7 1.9 -0.8 5.3 
1887 4.0 5.9 5.2 2.5 5.2 1.6 2.1 4.9 7.0 5.1 5.0 2.5 10.7 2.2 2.2 -1.9 
1892 -1.9 0.0 -2.0 -3.2 -5.0 -1.9 -0.6 4.3 0.3 -4.0 -7.7 0.7 -7.4 -1.3 -0.1 -0.5 
1897 2.1 2.2 11.0 1.5 0.5 5.3 2.7 1.2 1.5 8.4 -9.2 2.6 2.7 1.1 1.3 -1.4 
1902 -3.3 -5.9 -5.2 -6.0 -2.7 -4.4 -4.4 -5.1 -4.9 -5.7 4.5 -5.4 6.3 -4.7 -6.5 0.1 
1907 -4.3 -4.9 -7.7 -0.6 -3.0 -3.9 -2.9 -3.1 -4.9 -9.3 -7.3 -2.0 -8.7 -1.2 -6.2 1.2 
1911 1.1 -2.8 -4.3 3.3 -1.4 -1.4 -0.4 -3.0 -0.1 12.2 4.6 5.9 2.2 -0.9 4.6 -2.6 
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Table 7: Railway ordinary share dividends paid (% par value), real dividend yields, real capital returns and total real returns (cont.) 
C) Total Real Returns (%) – 5 year moving average. 
  MEAN CR GER GNR GWR LYR LNWR LSWR LBSCR LCDR MSLR MR NBR NER SER TVR 
1872 10.8 10.0 3.4 9.2 21.0 1.3 8.1 8.8 20.6 12.9 12.6 6.1 16.3 10.5 12.0 9.2 
1877 8.4 10.0 12.5 4.6 6.6 4.5 6.8 9.6 15.1 6.3 7.9 6.3 13.1 4.9 9.0 9.2 
1882 4.0 3.2 5.8 2.4 8.4 2.3 6.6 2.5 2.1 -6.6 1.6 4.0 6.6 6.6 3.5 11.2 
1887 8.1 10.4 9.1 7.0 9.8 5.6 6.6 9.4 10.9 5.8 8.4 7.0 13.3 6.6 6.7 4.7 
1892 1.5 3.9 1.0 0.1 -1.0 1.8 3.6 8.1 5.3 -3.7 -4.8 4.7 -6.6 2.9 3.7 3.7 
1897 4.6 5.2 13.3 4.5 3.3 8.6 5.9 4.0 5.0 8.2 -8.0 5.9 3.0 4.4 4.2 2.0 
1902 -1.6 -3.5 -3.0 -5.1 -0.2 -2.0 -1.8 -2.7 -2.3 -6.7 3.4 -2.7 6.2 -1.9 -5.0 3.6 
1907 -1.6 -2.2 -4.3 2.4 0.5 -0.4 0.7 0.4 -0.8 -9.8 -7.8 1.5 -8.6 2.4 -3.3 5.0 
1911 3.9 0.4 -0.8 6.5 2.5 2.4 3.6 0.7 3.7 11.4 3.8 10.0 2.0 3.1 8.0 1.9 
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Table 8. Weights (%) of railway securities included in optimal portfolios for periods beginning 1870  
ALL and RAIL are the number of holdings. RAIL and WRAIL are domestic and foreign railway weightings respectively. Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  
PERIOD RAIL WRAIL ORD DEB PREF
GER GWR LNWR LSWR LBSCR MSLR MR NBR NER CRDB LCDRDB LYRDB LNWRDB LBSCRDB MSLRDB NBRDB GERP LNWRP NERP
1884 18.3 8.7 3.6 1.9 1.5 3.2 4.4 1.2 0.4 1.1 0.5 0.5
(2.1) (1.6) (1.7) (2.0) (1.8) (1.1) (1.1) (1.6) (1.3) (1.4)
1885 17.2 7.5 3.1 2.0 1.4 3.4 4.8 1.1 0.4 0.7 0.2 0.2
(1.9) (1.6) (1.6) (2.2) (1.7) (1.1) (0.9) (1.0) (0.7) (0.7)
1886 16.9 19.2 3.3 1.7 1.2 3.4 4.6 0.8 0.4 0.9 0.5
(1.8) (1.4) (1.3) (2.0) (1.7) (0.8) (0.9) (1.1) (1.0)
1887 24.8 4.5 2.5 2.0 2.3 0.3 4.0 4.8 1.0 0.5 2.7 0.5 1.0 0.4 2.8
(1.5) (1.6) (1.9) (0.7) (2.1) (1.5) (0.9) (1.1) (2.1) (1.1) (1.4) (0.8) (2.4)
1888 26.4 4.7 2.4 1.8 2.4 0.4 3.4 0.1 4.4 1.0 0.5 3.0 0.2 1.8 0.6 4.3
(1.3) (1.5) (1.8) (0.7) (1.8) (0.0) (1.3) (0.9) (0.9) (2.2) (0.6) (1.9) (1.0) (2.8)
1889 31.3 7.3 2.8 2.6 3.6 0.3 3.2 0.2 4.4 1.3 0.5 3.2 0.1 0.3 1.2 0.7 7.0
(1.3) (1.7) (2.3) (0.6) (1.7) (0.3) (1.3) (0.9) (0.9) (2.1) (0.3) (0.7) (1.3) (1.1) (3.3)
1890 24.5 14.5 3.9 2.1 1.2 0.7 3.3 3.6 0.6 0.4 3.6 0.5 0.9 0.2 3.4
(1.4) (1.4) (1.2) (1.0) (1.9) (1.1) (0.6) (0.9) (2.3) (1.0) (1.3) (0.4) (2.4)
1891 28.0 19.2 3.5 2.3 2.2 0.3 3.1 2.3 2.2 0.5 0.7 2.5 3.1 0.4 0.4 0.5 4.0
(1.3) (1.3) (1.6) (0.5) (1.8) (1.4) (0.8) (0.5) (1.1) (1.9) (2.3) (0.9) (0.7) (0.9) (2.4)
1892 43.4 14.6 2.5 2.8 1.9 4.6 2.6 1.5 1.0 0.4 0.7 11.8 3.1 2.0 2.4 0.1 0.7 5.1
(1.1) (1.4) (1.5) (2.1) (1.5) (1.0) (0.6) (0.4) (1.1) (3.9) (2.2) (2.0) (1.9) (0.3) (1.1) (2.7)
1893 41.0 14.1 2.0 2.0 1.5 6.3 3.5 1.0 0.9 0.2 0.7 11.6 4.5 1.1 2.7 0.4 2.7
(0.9) (1.1) (1.2) (2.2) (1.6) (0.8) (0.5) (0.3) (1.0) (3.6) (2.5) (1.4) (2.0) (0.7) (1.7)
1894 39.0 12.7 1.9 1.7 1.3 7.4 3.5 1.1 0.9 0.2 0.6 10.8 4.4 0.6 1.7 0.2 0.3 2.7
(0.9) (0.9) (1.0) (2.3) (1.7) (0.8) (0.5) (0.2) (1.0) (3.3) (2.5) (0.9) (1.5) (0.3) (0.5) (1.7)
1895 38.2 9.5 2.2 1.3 1.1 7.6 3.6 0.9 1.0 0.2 0.4 11.0 4.9 0.3 2.2 1.7
(0.9) (0.7) (1.0) (2.5) (1.6) (0.7) (0.5) (0.2) (0.8) (3.4) (2.5) (0.6) (1.8) (1.4)
1896 35.8 8.4 1.9 1.3 1.0 7.3 4.2 1.0 1.1 0.1 0.4 9.7 5.2 0.6 0.7 1.5
(0.8) (0.7) (0.8) (2.3) (1.7) (0.8) (0.5) (0.2) (0.6) (3.1) (2.7) (0.8) (0.9) (1.3)
1897 35.1 6.9 2.7 1.1 0.6 14.5 2.6 1.7 0.7 0.1 0.3 5.8 3.3 0.4 0.9
(1.0) (0.7) (0.7) (3.1) (1.4) (1.0) (0.4) (0.2) (0.6) (2.4) (1.9) (0.7) (1.0)
1898 28.4 7.8 2.4 0.4 0.4 14.7 3.0 2.3 0.6 0.1 0.3 2.5 1.3 0.1 0.3
(0.8) (0.4) (0.5) (3.0) (1.4) (1.2) (0.4) (0.2) (0.6) (1.5) (1.2) (0.3) (0.5)
1899 23.0 11.8 2.5 0.5 0.4 10.6 2.4 2.3 0.7 2.8 0.7 0.2
(0.9) (0.4) (0.5) (2.3) (1.1) (1.2) (0.4) (1.5) (0.7) (0.4)
1900 14.3 17.0 1.8 0.3 0.2 6.5 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.1 1.4 0.8 0.3 0.3
(0.7) (0.3) (0.4) (1.8) (0.7) (0.7) (0.3) (0.4) (1.1) (0.8) (0.5) (0.5)
1901 12.2 19.2 1.7 0.2 0.2 5.0 1.0 0.4 0.6 0.2 1.0 1.0 0.4 0.4
(0.7) (0.3) (0.3) (1.4) (0.6) (0.4) (0.3) (0.4) (0.8) (0.8) (0.5) (0.5)
1902 13.4 19.4 1.3 0.2 0.3 5.7 1.0 0.3 0.7 0.8 1.7 0.7 0.4 0.1
(0.6) (0.2) (0.4) (1.6) (0.6) (0.2) (0.6) (0.4) (1.1) (0.7) (0.6) (0.2)
1903 10.4 20.1 1.0 0.3 0.3 2.8 0.8 0.2 0.7 0.9 2.2 0.7 0.4
(0.5) (0.3) (0.3) (1.2) (0.6) (0.1) (0.6) (0.4) (1.3) (0.6) (0.5)
1904 11.4 21.2 1.2 0.3 0.2 3.0 0.8 0.3 0.7 1.1 2.2 0.6 0.7 0.2
(0.5) (0.3) (0.3) (1.1) (0.5) (0.2) (0.5) (0.4) (1.1) (0.5) (0.7) (0.3)
1905 12.7 19.7 1.0 0.4 0.2 3.6 0.9 0.2 1.2 1.1 3.0 0.6 0.3 0.1
(0.5) (0.4) (0.3) (1.2) (0.6) (0.1) (0.7) (0.4) (1.3) (0.6) (0.4) (0.2)
1906 11.4 20.3 0.9 0.3 0.2 3.6 0.7 0.3 1.2 0.7 2.5 0.4 0.4 0.1
(0.4) (0.3) (0.3) (1.2) (0.5) (0.2) (0.6) (0.3) (1.2) (0.5) (0.5) (0.2)
1907 8.5 32.4 0.6 0.3 0.2 3.5 0.3 0.2 1.0 0.7 0.1 1.1 0.3 0.2
(0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (1.1) (0.3) (0.2) (0.5) (0.3) (0.2) (0.8) (0.4) (0.2)
1908 7.5 33.8 0.6 0.3 2.5 0.4 0.2 0.6 0.4 2.2 0.3 0.0
(0.3) (0.2) (0.9) (0.4) (0.1) (0.4) (0.2) (1.0) (0.4) (0.0)
1909 6.9 33.2 0.4 0.3 2.3 0.6 0.1 0.6 0.4 1.9 0.2 0.2
(0.3) (0.2) (0.8) (0.4) (0.1) (0.4) (0.2) (1.0) (0.2) (0.3)
1910 8.0 34.8 0.5 0.3 0.1 2.7 0.3 0.2 0.8 0.4 0.1 1.9 0.2 0.2 0.2
(0.3) (0.2) (0.2) (0.9) (0.4) (0.1) (0.4) (0.2) (0.2) (1.0) (0.3) (0.3) (0.2)
1911 7.4 37.1 0.4 0.3 0.2 2.2 0.3 0.2 1.2 0.4 1.8 0.2 0.3 0.1
(0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.8) (0.2) (0.1) (0.5) (0.2) (0.8) (0.2) (0.3) (0.1)
1912 6.0 33.2 0.3 0.3 1.3 0.2 0.3 1.4 0.3 1.7 0.2
(0.2) (0.3) (0.6) (0.2) (0.2) (0.6) (0.1) (0.8) (0.2)
1913 5.7 35.0 0.3 0.3 1.3 0.3 0.3 1.0 0.4 1.8 0.1
(0.2) (0.2) (0.6) (0.3) (0.1) (0.5) (0.2) (0.8) (0.2)
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Figure 1. Total Real Returns to Railway Securities 1870-1913  
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Figure 2. Efficient Frontier and Optimal Portfolio 
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Figure 3. Sharpe ratios for periods beginning 1870 
The Sharpe ratio is the excess real return of a security over the real risk-free rate divided 
by its standard deviation. RAIL (max) is the domestic railway security with the best such 
ratio. RAIL (mean) and NON-RAIL (mean) are the simple averages of the ratios of each 
domestic railway security and each non-domestic railway sector respectively. WRAIL is 
the ratio for the foreign railway debenture sector. OPTIMAL PORTFOLIO is the ratio of 
the optimal portfolio. 
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Figure 4. Total weighting in domestic railway securities 
Domestic Railways represents the sum of the weights of the individual railway securities 
held in the optimal portfolio for various periods beginning in 1870 and ending in the year 
indicated on the horizontal axis. Foreign Railways represents the weighting in this sector 
in the optimal portfolio. The detail of individual railway weights is reported in Table 3. 
No. Holdings is the total number of domestic railway securities in the optimal portfolio. 
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Appendix 1. Quoted securities of Domestic Railway Companies 
CODE SECURITY 
(i) ORDINARY SHARES 
CR Caledonian Railway 
GER Great Eastern Railway 
GNR Great Northern Railway 
GWR Great Western Railway 
LBSCR London, Brighton & South Coast Railway 
LCDR London Chatham & Dover Railway 
LYR Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway 
LNWR London & North Western Railway 
LSWR London & South Western Railway 
MSLR/GCR 
Manchester Sheffield & Lincolnshire Railway (Great Central 
Railway)  
MR Midland Railway 
NBR North British Railway 
NER North Eastern Railway 
SER South Eastern Railway 
 
 
  
(ii) PREFERENCE SHARES 
GERP Great Eastern Railway 
GNRP Great Northern Railway 
GWRP Great Western Railway 
LNWRP London & North Western Railway 
MRP Midland Railway 
NERP North Eastern Railway 
  
(iii) DEBENTURES 
CRDB Caledonian Railway 
GERDB Great Eastern Railway 
GNRDB Great Northern Railway 
LBSCRDB London, Brighton & South Coast Railway 
LCDRDB London Chatham & Dover Railway 
LYRDB Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway 
LNWRDB London & North Western Railway 
MSLR/GCRDB 
Manchester Sheffield & Lincolnshire Railway (Great Central 
Railway)  
MRDB Midland Railway 
NBRDB North British Railway 
NERDB North Eastern Railway 
SERDB South Eastern Railway 
 
Appendix 2. Optimization Procedure 
The optimal weights resulting from this type of portfolio optimization technique are sensitive 
to minor changes in the expected returns of the assets. Consequently, to improve the precision 
of our estimates we employ a bootstrapping procedure, similar to Goetzmann and Ukhov 
(2006). According to this procedure, repeated and random draws from the distribution of 
returns are made for each asset or security. On each draw, the vector of expected returns and 
the variance-covariance matrix is estimated, and the optimal portfolio weights computed. 
From the resulting distribution of optimal weights, we calculate their mean values and the 
standard errors.  
 
Goetzmann and Ukhov (2006) assumed that investors held a maximum of 7 assets in their 
portfolio, each asset consisting of a diversified portfolio of securities in a given sector. They 
then estimated optimal portfolios for all possible subsets of 7 assets drawn from a total of 19 
assets in the investable universe. Finally, they ranked each of these portfolios by their Sharpe 
ratio. We depart from their approach in not assuming that investors held a maximum of 7 
assets. This assumption seems less plausible once we allow individual railway securities into 
our investable universe such that the total number of assets rises from 19 to 48.  
 
We therefore proceeded as follows. For each of the 30 periods beginning in 1870 and ending 
in a year between 1890 and 1913, we first optimised using all 48 assets, bootstrapping 1000 
times. We then dropped those assets with a zero, or virtually zero weight, that is less than 
0.1%. The remaining number of assets, including railway securities, varied between 14 and 
26 assets (see col.2, Table 3). Using the expected returns and variance-covariance matrix of 
the remaining assets, we ran the optimisation once more, again bootstrapping 1,000 times. 
The resulting optimal weights for domestic railway securities and the foreign railway sector 
are those reported in Table 3. Due to lack of space, we do not report the weights for the other 
sectors. A minimum of 10 of these 15 sectors were always included. The sectors most 
frequently excluded because of their unattractive return and risk characteristics were domestic 
infrastructure equity and debentures, world infrastructure equity and colonial government 
debentures. 
 
As a robustness check we ran the reduced form optimizations bootstrapping 10,000 times for 
1884, 1889, 1894, 1899, 1904, 1909 and 1913. The resulting optimal weights were similar to 
those reported and are available on request.  
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Appendix 3. Taff Vale Railway 
 
Taff Vale Railway was the smallest of the railways included in our universe in the first 
section of the paper. The next two smallest railways at the start of the period were the London 
Chatham and Dover, and the Manchester Sheffield and Lincolnshire. Both were at least twice 
as large as the Taff Vale, and all three were dwarfed by the other 12 railways. Taff Vale was 
an exceptionally attractive small stock in investment terms. It issued ordinary shares which 
were quoted on the LSE continuously throughout the period, and was the best performing 
security in the domestic railway sector as defined herein. The mean (standard deviation) of 
annual returns were 5.8% (6.9%), 7.3% (6.9%), and 3.0% (6.3%) in 1870-97, 1898-1913 and 
1870-1913 respectively. Since its small size makes it unrealistic to assume that investors 
could have allocated anything other than a tiny portion of their portfolios to its ordinary 
shares, it was excluded from the results reported in the main body of the paper. 
 
If we include Taff Vale ordinary shares in the investment universe, the overall domestic 
railway sector weighting in the optimal portfolio is higher throughout and would have 
fluctuated between 40% and 60% between 1884 and 1897, with the Taff Vale weighting 
varying between accounting for 20% and 35%. Thereafter both weightings fell sharply at the 
end of the century to around 20% and 10% respectively.  In the period to 1913, whilst the 
Taff Vale weighting stayed at the 10% level, the overall railway allocation fell below 15%. 
Therefore, the evolution of the overall domestic railway weighting over time does not change 
dramatically to that reported above, and the main result, namely, that the rational investor 
substantially reduced his domestic railway exposure around the turn of the century, stands.  
 
